Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 20 | Issue 4

Article 3

2014

Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now After
Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?
Lawrence Trautman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Computer Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 Rich. J.L. & Tech 13
(2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol20/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

VIRTUAL CURRENCIES; BITCOIN & WHAT NOW AFTER
LIBERTY RESERVE, SILK ROAD, AND MT. GOX?
Lawrence Trautman*
Cite as: Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies Bitcoin & What Now
After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13
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I. OVERVIEW
[1]
During 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department evoked the first use of
the 2001 Patriot Act1 to exclude virtual currency provider Liberty Reserve
from the U.S. financial system.2 This article will discuss: the regulation of
virtual currencies, cybercrimes and payment systems, darknets, Tor and
the “deep web,” Bitcoin; Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox.
Virtual currencies have quickly become a reality, gaining significant
traction in a very short period of time, and are evolving rapidly. Virtual
* Thanks to the following for their assistance in the research and preparation of this
article: Timothy Bauman, Edward W. Felten, Urs Gasser, Reuben Grinberg, Alvin
Harrell, Tomas Olov Larsson, Vili Lehdonvirta, Tyler Moore, John Palfrey, Nicholas
Plassaras, Ariel Rabkin, Mina Rady, Ulrike Schultz, Robin Teigland, John Trautman,
François Velde, Ruoke Yang, Zeynep Yetis and Jonathan Zittrain. All errors and
omissions are my own.
1

See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
224(b), 115 Stat. 272, 295; see also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=317501.
2

Press Release, Department of the Treasury, Treasury Identifies Virtual Currency
Provider Liberty Reserve as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern under USA Patriot Act Section 311 (May 28, 2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1956.aspx; see also Press
Release, Department of Justice, Co-founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to Money
Laundering in Manhattan Federal Court, (Oct. 31, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1163.html.
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currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement challenges
because of their ability to transcend national borders in the fraction of a
second, unique jurisdictional issues and anonymity due to encryption.
Due primarily to their anonymity, virtual currencies have been linked to
numerous types of crimes, including facilitating marketplaces for:
assassins, attacks on businesses, the exploitation of children (including
pornography), corporate espionage, counterfeit currencies, drugs, fake IDs
and passports, high yield investment schemes (Ponzi schemes and other
financial frauds), sexual exploitation, stolen credit cards and credit card
numbers, and weapons.
[2]
Innovation in the pace of developing new currencies and
technologies continues to create ongoing challenges for responsible users
of technology and regulators alike. While technological advances create
great opportunities to improve the health, living conditions, and general
wellbeing of mankind; new technologies also create great challenges for
nation states. Reminiscent of Lawrence Lessig’s comment that “code is
law,”3 James Grimmelman observes, “[u]nlike the rule of law, the rule of
software is simple and brutal: whoever controls the software makes the
rules.
And if power corrupts, then automatic power corrupts
automatically.”4
A. Structure of This Paper
[3]
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a background
describing virtual currencies, cybercrimes and payment systems is
presented. Section III depicts the regulation of Internet payments. Section
IV discusses and explores the mechanism, promise, ecosystem, and
vulnerabilities of Bitcoin. In Section V, Liberty Reserve is discussed, with
3

See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE (Basic Books 2d ed. 2006), available at
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf (discussing how code is
cyberspace's law).
4

James Grimmelmann, Anarchy, Status Updates, and Utopia, 34 PACE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358627.
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the implications from Silk Road presented in Section VI. In Section VII,
the demise of Mt. Gox is described. Section VIII depicts the collateral
impact on Bitcoin from the failures of Liberty Reserve, Silk Road and Mt.
Gox, and posits scenarios for Bitcoin’s likely future. Implications for
further research are then presented.
II. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, CYBERCRIMES & PAYMENT SYSTEMS
What is a Virtual Currency?
[4]
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) observes that
“[t]here are no legal definitions for a virtual economy or currency.”5
However, “[a] virtual currency is, generally, a digital unit of exchange that
is not backed by a government-issued legal tender. Virtual currencies can
be used entirely within a virtual economy, or can be used in lieu of a
government-issued currency to purchase goods and services in the real
economy.”6
[5]
FinCEN defines virtual currency as “those currencies that operate
like a currency in some environments, but does not have legal tender
status in any jurisdiction.”7 Mythili Raman defines virtual currency as “a

5

See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND
CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 3
(2013).
6

Id.

7

Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Cong. (Nov. 18, 2013) (statement of Edward W. Lowery III, Special Agent in Charge,
Criminal Investigative Division, U.S. Secret Service) (citing DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, GUIDANCE FIN-2013-G0001,
APPLICATION OF FINCENS’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING,
OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013)).
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medium of exchange circulated over a network, typically the Internet,
which is not backed by a government.”8 Moreover
Early centralized models, where the currency is controlled
by a single private entity, have expanded and now
encompass a wide range of business concepts. Some
centralized virtual currencies take the form of digital
precious metals, such as e-Gold and Pecunix, where users
exchange digital currency units ostensibly backed by gold
bullion or other precious metals. Others exist within
popular online games or virtual worlds, such as Farmville,
Second Life, or World of Warcraft. Still others are online
payment systems such as WebMoney and Liberty Reserve,
which are available generally outside of specific online
communities and denominate users’ accounts in virtual
currency rather than U.S. Dollars, Euros, or some other
national currency. Decentralized systems such as Bitcoin,
which have no centralized administrating authority and
instead operate as peer-to-peer transaction networks,
entered the scene relatively recently but are growing
rapidly. A network of sites and services, including
exchangers who buy and sell virtual currencies in exchange
for national currencies or other mediums of value, have
developed around virtual currency systems, as well.9

8

Press Release, Department of Justice, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili
Raman Testifies Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs (Nov. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-131118.html.
9

Id.

4
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[6]
The forerunner to today’s virtual currency may be found in a 1982
paper by computer scientist David Chaum.10 In 1990, Mr. Chaum founded
DigiCash which unfortunately failed during 1999.11 Aleksandra Bal notes
that unlike electronic money, where the “traditional money format is
preserved, as the stored funds are expressed in the same unit of account
(for example US dollars or euros). In virtual currency schemes, the unit of
account is changed into a virtual one (for example, Linden Dollars or
Bitcoins).”12 Indeed, the genesis of virtual currency appears to result from
the massive popularity of online games.13 Boston University’s Mark
10

See David Chaum, Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, In ADVANCES IN
CRYPTOLOGY: PROCEEDINGS OF CRYPTO 82 (1982), available at
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-4757-0602-4_18.
11

FM Interviews: David Chaum, FIRST MONDAY (July 1999), available at
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/article/view/683/593.
12

Aleksandra Bal, Stateless Virtual Money in the Tax System, 53 EUROPEAN TAXATION
351, 351 (July 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298537.
13

See generally David A. Bray & Benn Konsynski, Virtual Worlds: Multi-Disciplinary
Research Opportunities, 38 THE DATA BASE FOR ADVANCES IN INFORMATION
SYSTEMS, Nov. 2007, at 17, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016485 (discussing
how virtual worlds offer significant opportunities for research in many fields of research);
Hiroshi Yamaguchi, An Analysis of Virtual Currencies in Online Games (Sep. 1, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=544422 (analyzing the economic and monetary
system of online games and discussing its implications in the real economy); Jun-Sok
Huhh, An Economic Analysis on Online Game Service (Aug. 28, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335120 (investigating economic problems of a firm providing
online game services); Levent V. Orman, Virtual Money in Electronic Markets and
Communities (Cornell University, Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 27-2010,
June 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621725 (asserting that virtual money
can benefit money semantics and management); Matthew Elias, Bitcoin: Tempering the
Digital Ring of Gyges or Implausible Pecuniary Privacy (Oct. 3, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937769 (comparing different forms of digital currencies to
Bitcoin); Sukwon Thomas Kim, Why Bitcoin?: Structure and Efficiency of Markets for
Online Game Currency (Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334000
(analyzing markets for online game currencies); Sulin Ba & Dan Ke, Optimal Pricing
and Permissions Strategy for Virtual Good Creators in Second Life (Sept. 15, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271684 (discussing the impact of virtual worlds on
"the way people cooperate, communicate, and conduct business"); Vili Lehdonvirta,

5
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Williams observes that “Bitcoin has not been recognized by any of the
G20 countries as meeting the definition of currency as it lacks price
stability and does not provide a stable store of value. As a result it is a
speculative virtual commodity with no tangible value.”14
A. Illicit Use of Virtual Currencies
[7]
In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Mythili Raman observes that virtual
currencies present two primary law enforcement interests to the
Department of Justice (DOJ),
(1) deterring and prosecuting criminals using virtual
currency systems to move or hide money that is used to
facilitate, or is derived from, criminal or terrorist acts, i.e.,
money laundering; and (2) investigating and prosecuting
those virtual currency services that themselves violate laws
aimed at illegal money transmission and money
laundering.15

Virtual Item Sales as a Revenue Model: Identifying Attributes that Drive Purchase
Decisions, 9 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE RESEARCH 97 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351769 (analyzing the what drives virtual spending); Vili
Lehdonvirta, Real-Money Trade of Virtual Assets: New Strategies for Virtual World
Operators, in VIRTUAL WORLDS 113 (Mary Ipe ed., Icfai University Press 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351782 (exploring the implications of trading
virtual currencies for real money).
14

Hearing Regarding Virtual Currencies Before the New York State Department of
Financial Services (Jan. 28-29, 2014) (statement of Mark T. Williams, Banking
Specialist, Commodities and Risk Management Expert, Finance Department, Boston
University), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/williams.pdf. See generally David
Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? (Dec. 1, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2361599 (discussing whether bitcoin is a real currency).
15

Raman, supra note 8, at 1.
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[8]
Digital currencies are believed by the U.S. Secret Service to be
preferred by criminals because they offer
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

The greatest degree of anonymity for both users and
transactions.
The ability to quickly and confidently move illicit
proceeds from one country to another.
Low volatility, which results in lower exchange
risk, increasing the digital currency’s ability to be
an efficient means to transmit and store wealth.
Widespread adoption in the criminal underground.
Trustworthiness.16

Mythili Raman further explains
Criminals are nearly always early adopters of new
technologies and financial systems, and virtual currency is
no exception. As virtual currency has grown, it has
attracted illicit users along with legitimate ones. . . .
[S]ome criminals have exploited virtual currency systems
because of the ability of those systems to conduct transfers
quickly, securely, and often with a perceived higher level
of anonymity than that afforded by traditional financial
services. The irreversibility of many virtual currency
transactions additionally appeals to a variety of individuals
seeking to engage in illicit activity, as does their ability to
send funds cross-border.17

16

Lowery, supra note 7. But see E-mail from Ariel Rabkin, Postdoctoral Researcher,
Computer Science Department, Princeton University (Feb. 23, 2014, 16:59 CST) (on file
with author) (observing that Bitcoin prices have been famously volatile); and Danton
Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND.
L.J. 441, 441 (2014), available at http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/19-Bryans.pdf.
17

Raman, supra note 8, at 2.
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[9]
Virtual currencies, due primarily to their anonymity, have been
linked to numerous types of crimes, including facilitating marketplaces
for: assassins, attacks on businesses, exploiting children (including
pornography), corporate espionage, counterfeit currencies, drugs, fake IDs
and passports, high yield investment schemes (Ponzi schemes and other
financial frauds), sexual exploitation, stolen credit cards and credit card
numbers, and weapons.18
B. Marketplace for Assassins
[10] The diversity of illicit content available on underground message
boards is truly astonishing. Trend Micro, a member of the Digital
Economy Task Force reports “privately maintained sites that offer specific
types of goods and services. Some are pages with prices and contact
information for anonymous orders and others provide a full order and
payment management system . . . include[ing] hired assassins.”19 A New
York Times article regarding the website Silk Road and alleged exploits of

18

See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats and Promises of Virtual Currencies:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong.
(2013) (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, The International Centre for Missing
& Exploited Children); see also Christopher Bronk, Cody Monk & John Villasenor, The
Dark Side of Cyber Finance, 54 Survival: Global Politics & Strategy 129 (2012); Raman,
supra note 8; Fernando M. Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real
Damages: A Primer on Cybercrimes in the United States and Efforts to Combat
Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 116, 119 (2011); Malte Möser, Rainer Böhme &
Dominic Breuker, An Inquiry into Money Laundering Tools in the Bitcoin Ecosystem, in
Proceedings of the APWG eCrime Researchers Summit, San Francisco (ECRIME 2013),
available at http://maltemoeser.de/paper/money-laundering.pdf; William Hett, Digital
Currencies and the Financing of Terrorism, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4, ¶ 10 (2008),
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v15i2/article4.pdf.
19

Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong.
(2013) (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, The International Centre for Missing
& Exploited Children).
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Ross William Ulbricht, a/k/a “Dread Pirate Roberts,” points to a Baltimore
criminal complaint depicting the solicitation of several killings.20
C. Attacks on Businesses
[11] Examples of hacking attacks on businesses are recited daily by
virtually every major news source. Pinguelo and Muller observe that
“[a]ttacks on businesses include such things as the theft of intellectual
property, seizing bank accounts, generating and distributing malware, and
other disruptive activity.”21
Cybersecurity experts from the law
enforcement community observe that many of these illicit cyber services
are routinely available and purchased with virtual currencies.22
D. Child Exploitation
[12] In his November 18, 2013 testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ernie Allen,
President & CEO of the International Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (ICMEC), expresses concern about “the apparent migration of
commercial child sexual exploitation, including sex abuse images, child
exploitation and sex trafficking, along with other criminal enterprises to a
new unregulated digital economy, made up of digital currencies;
20

David Segal, Eagle Scout. Idealist. Drug Trafficker?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/business/eagle-scout-idealist-drug-trafficker.html.
21

Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 18, at 119; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, ECommerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 SMU
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW (2014), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2314119; Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C.
Wetherbe, Threats Escalate: Corporate Information Governance Under Fire, 8 JOURNAL
OF STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 105 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171026; Lawrence J. Trautman &
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology
Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L., 313 (2011).
22

Raman, supra note 8, at 2.

9
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anonymous online payment systems; anonymous internet tools; and file
hosting companies.”23 Examples of large scale providers of child
pornography are numerous. Accordingly,
In August 2013 the Irish founder/owner/operator of
Freedom Hosting, which the FBI called ‘the largest
facilitator of child pornography on the planet,’ was
arrested. Freedom Hosting maintained servers for a
number of Tor-based, so-called ‘deep web’ child
pornography sites and others. The best-known child
pornography sites included Lolita City, the Love Zone and
PedoEmpire, all of which accept Bitcoins for payment.
To shut down Freedom Holdings, law enforcement
exploited a ‘java script exploit,’ a vulnerability in the site,
enabling law enforcement to penetrate Tor and expose the
IP addresses of the users of Freedom Hosting.
Interestingly, in 2011 the hacktivist group, Anonymous,
hacked into Tor to shut down Lolita City. However, Lolita
City has reemerged with an estimated 15,000 members and
1.5 million child pornography images.24

23

See Allen, supra note 19; see generally Mark Latonero, Technology and Human
Trafficking: The Rise of Mobile and the Diffusion of Technology-Facilitated Trafficking
(Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177556 (discussing the role of
modern technologies in facilitating and combating human trafficking); Mark Latonero,
Human Trafficking Online: The Role of Social Networking Sites and Online Classifieds
(Sept. 1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045851 (examining the "role of
social networking cites and online classified ads in facilitating human trafficking");
Danah Boyd, Heather Casteel, Mitali Thakor & Rane Johnson, Human Trafficking and
Technology: A Framework for Understanding the Role of Technology in the Commercial
Exploitation of Children in the U.S., available at http://research.microsoft.com/enus/collaboration/focus/education/htframework-2011.pdf (discussing the role technology
plays in human trafficking).
24

Allen, supra note 19.
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[13] In another case known as Dreamboard, various measures were
employed to conceal the sale of child exploitation images and videos over
the Internet, including: the use of screen names or aliases rather than
actual names, all links to pornography were encrypted requiring passwords
only available to members, and all Internet access traffic was routed
through proxy servicers and sent through a pathway involving multiple
nodes designed to “disguise a user’s actual location and prevent law
enforcement from tracing Internet activity. Dreamboard members also
encouraged the use of encryption programs on their computers, which
password-protect computer files to prevent law enforcement from
accessing them in the event of a court-authorized search.”25
[14] In addition to those already cited, other child pornography sites
mentioned by ICMEC as accepting payment in digital currencies include
Hard Candy, Jailbait and others.26 During December 2013, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Raman announced the creation of a task force
to counter online child exploitation, observing that “[s]exual predators are
using technology to exploit and harm children, and we need to consider
whether technology-based solutions can help curb this abuse . . . we know
that the help and support of the innovators in the tech community are
critical.”27
E. Corporate Espionage
[15] Corporate espionage is rampant.
Technology provides
sophisticated tools to those who would seek to steal the intellectual
25

Press Release, Department of Justice, Dreamboard Member Sentenced to 45 Years in
Prison for Participating in International Criminal Network Organized to Sexually Exploit
Children (Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-crm034.html.
26

See Allen, supra note 19.

27

Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S., U.K. Law Enforcement Launch Task Force
to Counter Online Child Exploitation (Dec. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-crm-1299.html.
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property assets that represent future economic stability, jobs for our
children, and the promise of a society that moves forward in peace.
Assistant Director Richard McFeely states, “[t]he FBI will not stand by
and watch the hemorrhage of U.S. intellectual property to foreign
countries who seek to gain an unfair advantage for their military and their
industries . . . Since 2008, our economic espionage arrests have doubled;
indictments have increased five-fold; and convictions have risen eightfold.”28 Testimony reveals that many of the illicit cyber services involved
with corporate espionage are routinely available and purchased with
virtual currencies.29
F. Drugs
[16] Having started as an organized, illicit, cross-border activity, drug
trafficking now constitutes a serious threat to nation states because of its
close alliance with worldwide terrorist groups.30 Silk Road, described as
the “Amazon for Drugs,” is perhaps the most significant example of a site
reported to have been responsible for major sales, “[y]et, barely one month
later the site is back up and is operating again.”31 Liberty Reserve, the
28

Press Release, Department of Justice, Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals
Charged in Wisconsin with Theft of Amsc Trade Secrets (June 27, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/June/13-crm-730.html; see also Pinguelo & Muller,
supra note 18 at 126; Joshua Nathan Aston, Narco-Terrorism – A Critical Study (Jan. 29,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221590.
29

See generally Raman, supra note 8 (noting the appeal of virtual currencies to
criminals); Trautman, Triche & Wetherbe, supra note 21(examining cyber security
threats).
30

See generally Aston, supra note 28 (observing that transnational organized crime is
considered as one of the major threats to human security, impeding the political, social,
economic, and cultural development of societies worldwide).
31

Allen, supra note 18. But see Jose Pagliery, Drug Site Silk Road Wiped Out by Bitcoin
Glitch, CNN MONEY (Feb. 14, 2014, 11:16 AM)
http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/14/technology/security/silk-road-bitcoin/ (reporting Silk
Road victim of hacking loss of $2.7 million).
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other major digital currency service to receive focus in this paper,
“allegedly laundered more than $6 billion in suspected proceeds of
crimes.”32 The DOJ’s announcement of Vladimir Kats’ guilty plea reports
that before operations were stopped during May 2013, “Liberty Reserve
had more than one million users worldwide, including more than 200,000
users in the United States who conducted approximately 55 million
transactions through its system and allegedly laundered more than $6
billion in suspected proceeds of crimes, including . . . narcotics
trafficking.”33 Other arrests have been reported. For example, “in
February [2013] Australian police arrested a cocaine dealer operating on
Silk Road and being paid in Bitcoins. In May [2013] Israeli police broke
up a drug distribution ring operating in Bitcoins.”34
G. Fake IDs and Passports
[17] Just one of many cases involving the use of and sale of false
identities and counterfeit certificates of title, the U.S. Department of
Justice reported in October, 2013 that Romanian fugitive Nicolae Popescu
and his criminal syndicate held non-existent high-value items such as
boats, cars, and motorcycles
priced generally between $10,000 to
$ ,000
and “produced and used high-quality fake passports . . . as
identification by co-conspirators in the United States to open bank
accounts.”35 In this and similar cases, the DOJ reported that “the illicit
32

Press Release, Department of Justice, Co-Founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to
Money Laundering in Manhattan Federal Court (Oct. 31, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1163.html.
33

Id.

34

Allen, supra note 18; see Segal, supra note 20, ¶ 2 (citing $1.2 billion of transactions,
many for cocaine, heroin and LSD).
35

Press Release, Department of Justice, Indictment Unsealed and “Wanted” Posters
Issued for Fugitives Charged With Multimillion Dollar International Cyber Fraud
Scheme (Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13crm-1128.html.
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proceeds were then withdrawn from the U.S. bank accounts and sent to the
defendants in Europe by wire transfer and other methods [often virtual
currencies].”36
H. High Yield Investment Schemes
[18] Ponzi schemes and other forms of financial frauds seem to find
virtual currencies attractive. Observing that “cyber criminals were among
the first illicit groups to take widespread advantage of virtual currency,”
Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman stated that “high-yield
investment schemes” are among the types of crimes conducted with the
use of virtual currencies.37
I. Sexual Exploitation
[19] Recent Congressional hearings produced testimony revealing that
“[w]hile much of the evidence is still anecdotal, there is consensus that . . .
sexual exploitation, sex trafficking and other criminal enterprises are
increasingly moving to a new unregulated, unbanked digital economy.”38

36

Id.

37

Raman, supra note 8. See generally Tyler Moore, Jie Han & Richard Clayton, The
Postmodern Ponzi Scheme: Empirical Analysis of High-Yield Investment Programs, in
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 41 (Angelos D. Keromytis, Ed., 2012),
available at http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-642-32946-3 (describing an
extensive online ecosystem that has developed in support of these HYIPs, including
discussion websites, digital currencies, and third-party aggregator websites that track
HYIP performance); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: Today Techies, Tomorrow the World?,
MILKEN INST. REV. 22, 24 (First Quarter 2012), available at
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2012_1/22-31MR53.pdf (discussing
the criminal use of Bitcoin).
38

Allen, supra note 18; see also Latonero, supra note 23.
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J. Stolen Credit Cards
[20] Just one of the many examples of the sale of credit card or
personally identifiable information (PII) involving hundreds of thousands
of American’s accounts is found in the DOJ’s 15-count indictment of
Vietnamese national, Hieu Minh Ngo, age 2 , “charging him with
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, substantive wire fraud, conspiracy to
commit identity fraud, substantive identity fraud, aggravated identity theft,
conspiracy to commit access device fraud, and substantive access device
fraud.”39 The DOJ further states that “Ngo and his co-conspirators created
one or more accounts with a digital currency service and used those
accounts to receive funds for the stolen payment card data, ‘fullz’ and
other PII that they sold.”40
K. Darknets, Tor & the “Deep Web”
[21] Although not the specific cryptographic tool used to produce
virtual currencies such as (potentially anonymous) Bitcoin, a number of
“deep web” tools exist to ensure privacy and deserve brief mention here.
These cryptographic tools may be used for both good and evil acts. For
example, many sites dealing in illegal drugs and other illicit goods and
39

Press Release, Department of Justice, Vietnamese National Charged in Widespread
International Scheme to Steal and Sell Hundreds of Thousands of U.S. Persons’
Personally Identifiable Information (Oct. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1116.html.
40

Id.; see also Press Release, Department of Justice, Romanian National Sentenced to 21
Months in Prison for Role in Multimillion-Dollar Scheme to Remotely Hack into and
Steal Payment Card Data from Hundreds of U.S. Merchants’ Computers (Jan. 7, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-crm-028.html; Press Release,
Department of Justice, International Cybercriminal Extradited from Thailand to the
United States (May 3, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/May/13crm-502.html; Trautman, Triche & Wetherbe, supra note 21 (providing a recent account
of credit card fraud and corporate cybersecurity risk); Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price,
supra note 21.
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services such as Silk Road and Black Market Reloaded rely on anonymous
proxy network Tor “to prevent law enforcement from identifying the sites’
operator and users.”41
[22] Anonymizing tools such as Tor have provided significant benefits
to enable secure communications for: governments, law enforcement
agencies, businesses; journalists as they work to communicate with
dissidents and send confidential news, enabled oppressed peoples during
the “Arab Spring” to overthrow oppressive regimes, and influenced
governmental change recently in Egypt in large measure by enabling
individuals and political activist groups to communicate privately with
reduced fear of reprisals.42 Other groups such as “the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) recommend Tor as a mechanism for maintaining civil
liberties online. Corporations use Tor as a safe way to conduct
competitive analysis, and to protect sensitive procurement patterns from
eavesdroppers.”43
[23] Tor in its present form is an outgrowth of “[T]he [O]nion
[R]outing” (TOR) project, (as in pealing back the layers of an onion),
originally funded and nurtured by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.44
To mask a users identity disclosed by a senders or receivers’ header
information (traffic analysis), the Tor system distributes a transaction
41

Timothy Bauman, Commerce and Reputation in Online Illegal Drug Markets (Apr. 3,
2013) (unpublished Senior Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton University) available at
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01sq87bt70p.
42

See generally Mina Rady, Anonymity Networks: New Platforms for Conflict and
Contention 22 (MIT Political Science Department, Research Paper No. 2013-5),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2241536 (discussing the various consequences of
anonymity network).
43

Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, available at
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited April 10, 2014).
44

Id.
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“over several places on the Internet, so that no single point can link you to
your destination.”45 Bauman observes that Tor
Prevents traffic analysis by encrypting both the header and
the content and sending them both through a series of proxy
servers, known as nodes, each of which knows only the
identities of the adjacent proxies in the chain. Every node
in the chain would have to be compromised for an attacker
to discover both the originator and the recipient of a packet.
This allows for a near-guarantee of anonymity as long as at
least one node in the chain is trusted, and as long as there
are enough other users of the Tor network that an
individual’s traffic is hard to identify . . . Tor relays exist
all over the world, which helps them effectively anonymize
traffic. The two countries with the most relays are the
United States, with about 800, followed by Germany with
about 00. More than 300 list their country code as “zz,”
which does not correspond to a real country, thereby
attempting to hide the country of that relay.46
A graphic depiction of a Tor network is presented at Figure 1.

45

The Solution: A Distributed, Anonymous Network, TOR PROJECT, available at
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited April 10, 2014)
[hereinafter The Solution].
46

Bauman, supra note 41 at 12 (citing Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson & Paul
Syverson, Tor: The Second-generation Onion Router, Naval Research Lab, Wash. D.C.
(2004); see also Tor Metrics Portal: Network, TOR PROJECT, available at
https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html (last viewed April 10, 2014)).
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Overview of Tor Mechanism47

[24] The Tor network directs message packets to take a random path
through numerous difficult-to-identify interim relays rather than the most
direct route, thereby covering a messenger’s “tracks so no observer at any
single point can tell where the data came from or where it’s going.”48 Tor
works by constructing a circuit of encrypted network relay connections to
create a unique secured private pathway for information or transaction
flow. According to the Tor project
The circuit is extended one hop at a time, and each relay
along the way knows only which relay gave it data and
47

Rady, supra note 42 at 6.

48

The Solution, supra note 45.
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which relay it is giving data to. No individual relay ever
knows the complete path that a data packet has taken. The
client negotiates a separate set of encryption keys for each
hop along the circuit to ensure that each hop can’t trace
these connections as they pass through.
Once a circuit has been established, many kinds of data can
be exchanged and several different sorts of software
applications can be deployed over the Tor network.
Because each relay sees no more than one hop in the
circuit, neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised relay
can use traffic analysis to link the connection’s source and
destination. Tor only works for TCP [Transmission
Control Protocol] streams and can be used by an
application with SOCKS [Socket Secure] support.49
[25] Tor hidden services offers an environment where users may instant
message or publish materials and keep their locations anonymous by
“[u]sing Tor ‘rendezvous points,’ other Tor users can connect to these
hidden services, each without knowing the other’s network identity . . . .
Nobody [is] able to determine who [is] offering the site, and nobody who
offered the site would know who [is] posting to it.”50
[26] It should come as no surprise that criminals are attracted to the
ability to communicate and conduct financial transactions on an
anonymous basis. These “[o]nline black markets capitalize on Tor’s
49

Id.

50

The Tor Project, Hidden Services, available at
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en; see also Nassim Nazemi, Note and
Comment: DMCA § 512 Safe Harbor for Anonymity Networks Amid a Cyber-Democratic
Storm: Lessons from the 2009 Iranian Uprising, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 855, 868-70 (2012).
But see Nicholas Hopper, Short Paper: Challenges in Protecting Tor Hidden Services
From Botnet Abuse, available at http://ifca.ai/fc14/papers/fc14_submission_152.pdf
(describing the potential for a decrease in the privacy of hidden service users).
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anonymizing features to offer a wide selection of illicit goods and services
. . . .”51
III. REGULATION OF INTERNET PAYMENTS
[27] With the volume of online transactions achieving tremendous
growth during the past two decades, the ability to securely accept online
payments has become profoundly important for global business.52
Unfortunately, as Fred Chang observes, “[o]ur trust in cyberspace has
been taken from us by hackers, cybercriminals and sophisticated cyber
attackers who intend to do us harm . . . . Attacks on both the public sector
and the private sector are rampant. Denial of service, identity theft, and
cyber extortion are now all too common.”53 Therefore, “[c]reating and
protecting trust . . . becomes a crucial issue in the regulation of payment
services . . . . It is generally accepted that adequate regulation is a key precursor to consumer acceptance of new payment methods, including mobile
banking and payments.”54
Regulation should reflect the ethical
51

Raman, supra note 8, at 2. But see Andrew Grossman, Federal Agents Pierce Tor
Web-Anonymity Tool, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579461641349857358
(contending that Tor’s anonymity shield isn’t impenetrable).
52

See, e.g., Paul Benjamin Lowry, Taylor Michael Wells, Greg Moody, Sean Humphreys
& Degan Kettles, Online Payment Gateways Used to Facilitate E-Commerce
Transactions and Improve Risk Management, 17 Comm. of the Ass’n for Info. Sys.
(CAIS) 1, 3 (2006) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=879797; see also Brian Mantel &
Timothy McHugh, Competition and Innovation in the Consumer e-Payments Market?
Considering the Demand, Supply, and Public Policy Issues 33 (Emerging Payments
Occasional Working Paper Series, Paper No. EPS-2001-4, 2001) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=298388.
53

Hearing on Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions Before the Subcomm. on Tech.,
Subcomm. on Research, & H. Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., 113th Cong. (2013)
(statement of Frederick R. Chang, President & COO, 21CT, Inc.).
54

Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the Future?, J.
BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 1, 38 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285247.
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implications of payment systems and virtual currencies such as Bitcoin.
For example, Angel and McCabe observe that:
Proponents of the use of the bitcoin system view it as a
workaround for their lack of trust in the existing payment
infrastructure, dependent as it is on a fallible central bank
or other payment intermediary . . . . The continuing
evolution in the technology of payments raises interesting
ethical questions for businesses as well as public policy
considerations . . . . Situations in which the bargaining
power of one of the parties is limited raise questions about
the fairness of the result . . . . A new payment system such
as bitcoin, like any tool, is neither good nor evil on its own,
but it is the ethical or unethical use of the payment system
that matters.55
[28] Lowry, Wells, Moody, Humphreys and Kettles observe that the
academic literature about electronic internet payment systems proposes
models,56 protocols,57and architectures58 to facilitate online payments.
55

JAMES J. ANGEL & DOUGLAS MCCABE, THE ETHICS OF PAYMENTS: PAPER, PLASTIC, OR
BITCOIN? 14-16 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379233.
56

See Lowry et al., supra note 52, at 5 (citing X. Hou & C. H. Tan, A New Electronic
Cash Model 374-79, Paper presented at the Int’l Conference on Info. Tech.: Coding and
Computing, Las Vegas, NV, April 4-6, 2005; S. F. Mjølsnes & C. Rong, On-line e-Wallet
System with Decentralized Credentials Keepers, 8 MOBILE NETWORKS AND
APPLICATIONS 87 (2003) available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=603909).
57

Id. (citing A.R. Dani, P.R. Krishna & V. Subramanian, An Electronic Payment System
Architecture for Composite Payment Transactions, Paper presented at the International
Conference on e-Technology, e-Commerce, and e-Service, Hong Kong, China, March
29-April 1 2005 at 552-555; M. Kinateder & K. Rothermel, Bringing Confidence to the
Web-Combining the Power of SET and Reputation Systems, Paper presented at the First
IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, Las Vegas, NV, Jan. 5-8,
2004 at 545-550; B. Meng & Q. Xiong, SOCPT: A Secure Online Card Payment
Protocol, Payment presented at the 8th International Conference on Computer Supported
Cooperative Work in Design, Xiamen, China, May 26-28, 2004 at 679-684; V.
Varadharajan & Y. Mu, On the Design of secure Electronic Payment Schemes for
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Other studies provide mathematical proofs of specific protocols.59 These
models, protocols and architectures focus on providing security,
accountability, atomicity, anonymity, non-repudiation, and fairness to
transactions.60 For online payment systems, the most vital of these may be
security,61 identified identification, confidentiality, authentication, data
integrity, non-repudiation, and customer solvency as key levels of security
surrounding payment alternatives.62
Internet, Paper presented at the 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
San Diego, CA, Dec. 9-13, 1996 at 78-87).
58

Id. (citing H. Knospe & S. Schwiderski-Grosche, Future Mobile Networks: Ad-hoc
Access Based on Online Payment with Smartcards, Paper presented at the 13th IEEE
International Symposium on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile radio Communications,
Lisbon, Portugal, Sept. 15-18, 2002 at 197-200; A. Liu, V.Y. Shen & J.K. Muppala,
Security Issues on Server-Side Credit-Based Electronic Payment Systems, Paper
presented at the 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce, Research
Triangle Park, NC, Oct. 18-19 at 47-57; J. ZHANG ET AL., MIGRATION TO WEB SERVICES
ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE A CASE STUDY 1624 (2004)).
59

Id. (citing M. Backes & M. Dürmuth, A Cryptographically Dound Dolev-Yao Style
Security Proof of an Electronic Payment System, Paper presented to the 18th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, June 20-22 Axin-en-Provence, France at 78;
G. Bella, F. Massicci & L.C. Paulson, The Verification of an Industrial Payment
Protocol: The SET Purchase Phase, Paper presented at the 9th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, Washington, DC, Nov. 18-22 at 12 available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~lp15/papers/Bella/purchase.pdf).
60

Id. (citing Meng & Xiong, supra note 57).

61

Lowry et al., supra note 52, at 5 (citing I. Mavridis, G. Pangalos, T. Koukouinos & S.
Muftic, A Secure Payment System for Electronic Commerce, Paper presented at the 10th
International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications, Florence, Italy,
Sept. 1-3, 1999 at 832; J. Sahut & M. Galuszewska, Electronic Payment Market: A Nonoptimal Equilibrium, Paper presented at the 2004 International Symposium on
Applications and the Internet Workshops, Tokyo, Jan. 26-30, 2004 at 3).
62

Id. at 5-6 (quoting J. Sahut & M. Galuszewska, Electronic Payment Market: A Nonoptimal Equilibrium, Paper presented at the 2004 International Symposium on
Applications and the Internet Workshops, Tokyo, Jan. 26-30, 2004 at 3).
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A. Regulatory Fabric
[29] The schematic for regulation of money transmission in the United
States involves both State and Federal laws. Primarily, an anti-money
laundering statute, the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) regulates transmission
at the Federal level.63
B. U.S. State Money Transmission Laws
[30] By contrast with federal statutes, “State money transmitter laws
vary by jurisdiction and focus on consumer protection concerns.”64
Accordingly, state money transmitter laws are essentially ‘safety and
soundness’ statutes designed to ensure that consumer funds are protected
from loss.65 These state “statutes historically regulated money transfer
businesses like Western Union with an eye toward preventing consumer
harm. The plain language of such statutes, however, purports to broadly
regulate the receipt of money or monetary value for the purpose of
transmitting it to another place or location by any means.”66 It appears
63

Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA L.REV. 77, 86 (2013),
(citing 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2011); FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited May 18,
2014); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin vs. Regulated Payment Systems:
What Gives?, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. (2014).
64

Id. at 85 (citing UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT, prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 163-64 (2004),
available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/money%20services/umsa_final04.pdf (last
visited Aug. 18, 2013) (noting that state laws are ‘extremely varied’); see, e.g., CAL. FIN.
CODE § 2002 (Deering 2014) (the purpose is to protect the interests of consumers); VA
CODE ANN. § 6.2-1902(B) (2010) (the statute shall be construed for the purpose of
protecting, against financial loss, citizens of Virginia who purchase money orders or
control of their funds or credit into the custody of another person for transmission).
65

See UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT, supra note 64.

66

Kevin V. Tu, supra note 63, at 77.
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that both enforcement and clear guidance by some states has been
inconsistent, and “in the face of such uncertainty, Amazon, Google, and
PayPal have all become licensed money transmitters under state law.
Even Facebook has become licensed in advance of launching a payments
product in order to mitigate the risk of sanctions as the development of
their payments product continues to evolve.”67
[31] A license is required in most states before a money transmitter may
conduct business.68 Therefore, any entity operating as a money transmitter
that fails to obtain the necessary state licensing or to register with FinCEN
may become subject to criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §1960.69
Many virtual currency systems, exchangers, and related
services operate as money transmitters, which are part of a
larger class of institutions called money services
businesses. Money transmitters are required under 31
U.S.C. §5330 to register with the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN). . . . Additionally, the
general money laundering and spending statutes, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956 and 1957, cover financial transactions involving
virtual currencies. Finally, where virtual currencies are
used in furtherance of underlying criminal activity, the
Department [of Justice] can rely on traditional criminal
statutes proscribing that activity, such as narcotics,
cybercrime, child exploitation, and firearms laws.70

67

Id. at 78; see also Trautman, supra note 21, at 22.

68

Raman, supra note 8.

69

Id.

70

Id.
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[32] During the early part of 2014, FinCEN published two
administrative rulings regarding virtual currencies, providing much needed
guidance. Accordingly,
The first ruling states that, to the extent a user creates or
“mines” a convertible virtual currency solely for a user’s
own purposes, the user is not a money transmitter under the
BSA. The second states that a company purchasing and
selling convertible virtual currency as an investment
exclusively for the company’s benefit is not a money
transmitter.71
[33] In addition to money transmission statutes, states have also
adopted cybercrime statutes. Because Virginia is the home state to many
Internet service providers including America OnLine, “it has been dubbed
‘the epicenter of Internet traffic,’ and has adopted some of the toughest
cybercrime legislation in the country.”72 Pinguelo and Muller provide a
forty-nine state survey of cyberlaw legislation as of 2013.73
[34] The New York State Department of Financial Services announced
in August 2013 that it has launched a fact-finding effort regarding
guidelines for regulating virtual currencies with a view toward exploring
the potential NYDFS issuance of a ‘BitLicence’.74 In his opening
statement for Hearings on the Regulation of Virtual Currency, New York
71

Press Release, FinCEN, FinCEN Publishes Two Rulings on Virtual Currency Miners
and Investors (Jan. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20140130.pdf.
72

Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 18, at 149.

73

See id. at 150-55.

74

See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., NYDFS Outlines Additional Details on
Witnesses and Panels for Virtual Currency Hearing on January 28 and 29 in New York
City (Jan. 23, 2014), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/panels_witnesses_virtual_currency_hearing.pdf.
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Superintendent of Financial Services, Benjamin M. Lawsky, stated that
“[i]t’s hard to say precisely what the future holds for virtual currency and
its associated technology. Currently, there is not widespread adoption of
virtual currencies among the general public. And some doubt whether
there will ever be.”75 Moreover,
[S]erious people – in the technological and investment
community – are taking virtual currencies seriously. They
are putting significant amounts of time, attention, and
capital behind them. We, as a regulator, cannot turn a blind
eye to something like that. We don’t really have a choice.
Moreover, the Department of Financial Services – like
many other state financial regulators – has a specific legal
responsibility to license and regulate money transmission.
And to the extent that some virtual currency service
providers are engaged in money transmission, we do have
an important role in writing and enforcing the rules of the
game for financial firms . . . . [V]irtual currency could
ultimately have a number of benefits for our financial
system. It could force the traditional payments community
to "up its game" in terms of the speed, affordability, and
reliability of financial transactions . . . . Fashioning
appropriate guardrails for virtual currencies presents
challenging questions for regulators. Virtual currency is
not easily categorized within the divisions we traditionally
think about when it comes to the financial system (such as
banks, insurers, or money transmitters). It’s neither fish
nor fowl.76

75

Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Serv., N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., Opening
Statement to Hearings on the Regulation of Virtual Currency (Jan. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/lawsky_vchearing.pdf.
76

Id.
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Indeed, Superintendent Lawsky suggests that the term “money
transmission” connotes an image of “firms that were formed more than
1 0 years ago when our country was still exploring the western frontier.”77
The challenge to regulators everywhere is to determine “what type of
licensing, examination, and collateral re uirements for the virtual currency
industry will provide appropriate guardrails to protect consumers and our
national security without stifling beneficial innovation.”78 Moreover,
Safety and soundness requirements help build greater
confidence among customers that the funds that they
entrust to virtual currency companies won’t get caught in a
virtual black hole. Indeed, some consumers have expressed
concerns about how quickly their virtual currency
transactions are processed. There have also been public
reports of virtual currency lost – perhaps irretrievably –
through hacking and other cyber security vulnerabilities.
Addressing those issues through enhanced safety and
soundness requirements would be important to building
greater confidence in this technology among the general
public and promoting wider adoption.79
C. Implications for Tax Revenues
[35] Virtual transactions, virtual economies and transactions within
these virtual economies are often very different.80 Cryptocurrencies
77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.; accord Cameron Winklevoss & Tyler Winklevoss, Written Testimony of Cameron
and Tyler Winklevoss to the New York State Department of Financial Services NYDFS
Virtual Currency Hearing (Jan. 28 2014), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/hearing/vchearing/winklevoss.pdf.
80

See Leandra Lederman, 'Stranger than Fiction': Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1620, 1670-72 (2007); Theodore P. Seto, When is a Game Only a Game?: The
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present difficult challenges to taxing authorities worldwide.81
A
discussion of global tax issues and implications is beyond the scope of this
paper; however, with a focus on the United States, general comments are
provided to outline some of the major issues and suggest topics for further
research. Aleksandra Bal observes that “the uestion as to whether or not
virtual currency may constitute taxable income is likely to vary from
country to country.”82 Moreover, tax administrators worldwide face the
challenge of “how to approach a system that is outside the traditional
streams of commerce and finance and for users to understand the tax
conse uences of their transactions in virtual currencies.”83 Bal postulates
that taxable income may be generated from the following: “the creation of
virtual money ('mining'), the receipt of virtual currency as a gift (or reward
for some achievements within the game), the receipt of virtual currency in
exchange for (real or virtual) goods and services and the sale of digital
money for real currency.”84 In their May 2013 report to the U.S. Senate
Finance Committee, the GAO concluded that
Taxation of Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027, 1031, 1037-38, 1040 (2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1220923.
81

See Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the
Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
135, 196 (2013); Jennifer Isom, As Certain as Death and Taxes: Consumer
Considerations of Bitcoin Transactions for When the IRS Comes Knocking 12-13 (Dec. 9,
2013) (unpublished note), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365493; Steven S.
Chung, Note, Real Taxation of Virtual Commerce, 28 VA. TAX REV. 101, 131-34 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097793 (proposing that virtual currencies
integrating real cash into their economies through internal currency exchange systems
behave like foreign currencies and should be taxed under the foreign currency rules of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code); Bryan Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Taxing
Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 61-62 (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980693.
82

Bal, supra note 12, at 354.

83

Id. at 351.

84

Id. at 354.
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Virtual economies and the use of virtual currencies
intended as alternatives to government-issued currencies
are a recent phenomenon, and the extent to which their use
results in tax noncompliance is unknown. Given this
uncertainty, available funding, and other priorities, IRS
made a reasoned decision not to implement a compliance
approach specific to virtual economies and currencies.85
[36] Internal IRS research beginning during 2007 looked at virtual
economies and “did not find strong evidence of the potential for tax
noncompliance related to virtual economies, such as the number of U.S.
taxpayers involved in such activity or the amount of federal tax revenue at
risk.”86 After consulting with academics, tax practitioners, the IRS and
others, the GAO reports that the following tax compliance risks germane
to virtual currencies and virtual economies include: tax evasion,
mischaracterization, and underreporting.87 However, the GAO is quick to
observe that “[t]hese risks are not uni ue to virtual economies and
currencies, as they also exist for other types of transactions, such as cash
transactions, where there are not always clear records or third-party
tracking and reporting of transactions.”88 Accordingly, the GAO identifies
the following virtual currencies and economies compliance risks: lack of
taxpayer knowledge regarding tax requirements; uncertainty over how to
characterize income; uncertainty over how to calculate basis for gains;
challenges with third-party reporting; and tax evasion.89 Akins, Chapman
and Gordon conclude that “creating, or mining, bitcoin should be
85

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 5, at 16.

86

Id. at 15.

87

See id. at 12.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 12-14.
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characterized as income for services and reported as such. At the same
time, transactions involving the exchange of bitcoin for legal currency,
goods, or services should be reported as a capital gain or loss
transaction.”90 On March 25, 2014, the IRS provided guidance stating that
“[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property. General
tax principles applicable to property transactions apply to transactions
using virtual currency.”91
[37] Omri Marian suggests that “[c]ryptocurrencies offer, at least
theoretically, a near-perfect alternative to tax-evaders who can no longer
find a safe haven in tax-haven jurisdictions.”92 Marian further observes
that “[c]ryptocurrencies possess the traditional characteristics of tax
havens: earnings are not subject to taxation and taxpayers’ anonymity is
maintained. Cryptocurrencies, however, also possess one added value:
their operation is not dependent on the existence of financial
institutions.”93
D. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
[38] A bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department, FinCEN, reports
directly to the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Consisting

90

Benjamin Akins et al., A Whole New World: Income Tax Considerations of the Bitcoin
Economy, PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394738##.
91

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, NOTICE 2014-21, VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE
(2014); see also John D. McKinnon & Ryan Tracy, Bitcoin Investors Face the Real IRS,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303949704579461502538024502
.
92

Omri Y. Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies 'Super' Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 38, 47 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2305863.
93

Id. at 39.
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of only approximately 340 employees,94 FinCEN’s “mission is to
safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering
and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of financial intelligence and strategic use of financial
authorities.”95 Among FinCEN’s responsibilities is to issue regulations
and administer the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).96 The BSA requires that a
wide range of financial institutions assist FinCEN by having effective antimoney-laundering (AML) programs and by filing periodic reports with
FinCEN and by maintaining appropriate records. Examples of these
financial institutions include: securities and futures broker/dealers,
insurance companies, banks, casinos, other money services businesses,
and certain trades or businesses such as automobile dealers.97
[39] In March 2013, FinCEN provided interpretive guidance for those
individuals and businesses offering virtual currencies and those engaged in
providing money transmittal.98 While acknowledging that there are some
troublesome virtual currency providers, FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky
Calvery observes that the impact of troublesome providers are mitigated
by the positive innovative contributions provided by virtual currencies,
and the financial inclusion that they might offer society. A whole host of
94

See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013)
(statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network,
United States Department of the Treasury).
95

Id.

96

Id.

97

See Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks at
the Independent Armored Car Operators Association Cash in Transit Networking
Conference (May 18, 2014).
98

FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, (2013), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2013-G001.html.
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emerging technologies “in the financial sector have proven their capacity
to empower customers, encourage the development of innovative financial
products, and expand access to financial services. We want these
advances to continue.”99 Observing that financial institutions have the
responsibility to ensure transparency and integrity, Director Calvery states
FinCEN’s guidance explains that administrators or
exchangers of virtual currencies have registration
requirements and a broad range of AML program,
recordkeeping, and reporting responsibilities.
Those
offering virtual currencies must comply with these
regulatory requirements, and if they do so, they have
nothing to fear from Treasury.
The guidance explains how FinCEN’s ‘money transmitter’
definition applies to certain exchangers and system
administrators of virtual currencies depending on the facts
and circumstances of that activity. “Those who use virtual
currencies exclusively for common personal transactions
like buying goods or services online” are not affected by
this guidance.
Those who are intermediaries in the transfer of virtual
currencies from one person to another person, or to another
location, are money transmitters that must register with
FinCEN as MSB [money service business], unless an
exception applies. Some virtual currency exchangers have
already registered with FinCEN as MSBs, though they have
not necessarily identified themselves as money
transmitters.100
99

Calvery, supra note 94 at 10-11.

100

Calvery, supra note 94; see also FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, (2013), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2013-G001.html.
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E. Digital Economy Task Force
[40] The Digital Economy Task Force is an outgrowth of a conference
held on June 14, 2013 at the World Bank and included officials from the
European Central Bank, ICMEC, International Monetary Fund, Thomson
Reuters, the U.S. Federal Reserve, U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Office on Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, and others. With a
view toward exploring “reasonable, constructive solutions, including best
practice models to address the challenge of anonymity,” the Task Force
issued its findings during March 2014 on the working group topics of:
“Defining the Problem; Regulation; Law Enforcement; Human
Rights/Financial Inclusion; and Interagency Cooperation and
Coordination.”101
F. Virtual Currency Emerging Threats Working Group
(VCET)
[41] The FBI founded the Virtual Currency Emerging Threats Working
Group (VCET) during early 2012 to address and “mitigate the crossprogrammatic threats arising from illicit actors’ use of virtual currency
systems.”102 Membership of VCET consists of an interagency assortment
of U.S. government, including within the DOJ: multiple U.S. Attorney’s
offices; the Criminal Division’s sections of Asset Forfeiture and Money
Laundering and Computer Crime and Intellectual Property; the Drug

101

See Allen, supra note 18; see generally INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED
CHILDREN, Preface to THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: POTENTIAL, PERILS, AND PROMISES: A
REPORT OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY TASK FORCE (Thomson Reuters 2014), available at
http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/legal/digital-economy/digital-economy-taskforce-report.pdf (proposing regulations to frame the policy discussion in a manner that
enables the digital economy to grow while creating an inhospitable environment for those
who seek to abuse it).
102

Raman, supra note 8, at 6.
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Enforcement Administration and the FBI.103 Many other law enforcement
groups have a mission concerning emerging payment systems and virtual
currencies. Far too numerous and clandestine to list them all, these
include: local, state, federal and international law enforcement agencies,
“the Secret Service and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s
Homeland Security Investigations (ICE/HSI) partner through the Secret
Service’s Electronic Crimes Task Forces (ECTFs), which leverage the
private sector, academia, and state and local law enforcement to support
cyber crime investigations.”104 The “New Payment Methods Ad Hoc
Working Group, a subgroup of the Terrorist Finance Working Group, led
by the State Department. The FBI specifically has issued numerous
intelligence products related to virtual currency, many . . . co-authored
with other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”105
G. Regulation of International Foreign Currencies
[42] The Great Depression of the 1930s highlighted the need for an
international institution to provide the stability of exchange rates,
international monetary cooperation and balanced growth of trade among
nations. Therefore, in July 1944, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was conceived by 45 countries meeting at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire.106 During December 1945, the IMF came into formal
existence when its Articles of Agreement were adopted by its initial 29
members.107 While virtual currencies were not contemplated during 1945,
of relevance to our discussion is the fact that the IMF is the international
103

Id.

104

Lowery, supra note 7, at 1.

105

Raman, supra note 8.

106

International Monetary Fund, About the IMF: History, Cooperation and
Reconstruction (1944-71), available at http://www.imf.org/external/about/histcoop.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
107

Id.
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organization consisting of almost every signatory nation state (except for
perhaps North Korea), and has the principal responsibility of coordinating
foreign currency exchange, as noted by the following stated purposes of
the IMF:
(i)

To promote international monetary cooperation
through a permanent institution which provides the
machinery for consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems.

(ii)

To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the
development of the productive resources of all
members as primary objectives of economic policy.

(iii)

To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly
exchange arrangements among members, and to
avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(iv)

To assist in the establishment of a multilateral
system of payments in respect of current
transactions between members and in the
elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which
hamper the growth of world trade. . . . 108

108

Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 2011 ed., available at
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/pdf/aa.pdf; see Articles of Agreement of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 ;
Participants, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, U.N.T.S.,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280165965 (last visited
Apr. 9, 2014) (listing the countries who participate in the International Monetary Fund).
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H. Regulatory Challenges
[43] The desire to formulate an enlightened and productive regulatory
environment for virtual currencies has been the subject of Congressional
hearings during recent months.109 Professor Sarah Jane Hughes offers her
vision of a future regulatory fabric with her recommendation that
Congress
1. Retain the current division of regulation between the
States and Federal Government
with prudential
regulation of the non-depository providers of new
payments systems with the States and retaining the antimoney-laundering, anti-terrorism and economic
sanctions regulations with the Federal Government.
2. Make providers of virtual currencies comply with the
customer-identification program and AML compliance
program requirements of Sections 326 and 352 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, and with the economic sanctions
regulations enforced by OFAC, just as other payments
systems providers do. Virtual currency customers will
have to reveal their identities to issuers of the
currencies they use. As a corollary, customers should
get the same federal financial privacy rights that users
of other payments products have under the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 and Title V of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
3. Encourage FinCEN to clarify the manner in which
customer-identification
and
AML
compliance
requirements apply to virtual currencies. This is needed
109

See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Cong. (2013), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/beyond-silk-roadpotential-risks-threats-and-promises-of-virtual-currencies.
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to help banks ensure that they can do business with
providers and users of virtual currencies and other
payments innovators. Second-stage innovations from
distributed computing and database technologies could
offer benefits to payments and commerce far beyond
those that virtual currencies now offer. If banks cannot
determine how to comply with FinCEN regulations, for
example, they may continue to terminate their
relationships with payments innovators before the
innovators can attract investors and users to make it to
the second-stage technologies their current work may
generate.
4. Encourage payments systems innovators to adopt and
publicize transparent payment systems rules for their
own systems and even to compete for customers on the
basis of the system rules they adopt. It is too early to
enact user protections for virtual currencies.
5. Ignore the claims that
a. additional regulation of virtual currencies will halt
innovations,
b. innovators deserve freedom from regulations that
apply to other payments systems and their
providers, and
c. virtual currencies deserve a single federal licensure
system that preempts State prudential regulation and
licensure.
6. Monitor the development of virtual currency providers
in case they transform their products into commodities
or securities and, if this happens, then decide whether
regulating their products under the applicable
regulations makes more sense.
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7. Leave room for non-depository and depository
providers of payments products to innovate in the
virtual currency space.
8. Authorize and fund a study of virtual currencies to be
carried out by the Federal Reserve Board or pursuant to
the Federal Advisory Committees Act by an interagency task force and industry participants.110
I. Unique Enforcement Challenges & Monetary
Stability
[44] Virtual currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement
challenges because of its: ability to transcend national borders in the
fraction of a second; unique jurisdictional issues; and anonymity due to
encryption. Gabriel Michael observes that “Bitcoin is a disruptive
technology that undermines the regulatory capacity of the state.”111 Mark
Williams observes that

110

The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: Hearing Before the Subcomms.
on Econ. Policy and on Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Trade and Fin. of the S. Banking Comm.,
113th Cong. 2-3 (2013) (statement of Sarah Jane Hughes, University Scholar and Fellow
in Commercial Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law), available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
12e58649-d425-428f-a52c-b7938051536b.
111

Gabriel J. Michael, Note, Anarchy and Property Rights in the Virtual World: How
Disruptive Technologies Undermine the State and Ensure that the Virtual World Remains
a "Wild West,” 21 (March 1, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233374. See
generally Shawn J. Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the ZeroMember LLC, 109 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366197 (discussing the consequences of Bitcoin as an
independently wealthy software); Harri Lahdenpera, Payment and Financial Innovation,
Reserve Demand and Implementation of Monetary Policy (Bank of Finland, Working
Paper No. 26/2001, 2001) (observing that private substitutes for central bank money are
available for the settlements of transactions, showing that effective monetary control by
the central bank indeed be compromised in those circumstances), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=315479; and Malte Mӧser, Ranier Bӧhme & Dominic Breuker,
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There are significant risks and uncertainties associated with
virtual currencies that need to be fully measured before
they are allowed to proliferate further or be adopted into the
financial system. Bitcoin presents numerous marketrelated risks as it is decentralized, volatile, untraceable,
unregulated, and provides no legal protection to customers.
If Bitcoin, in its embryonic stage, were to replace the U.S.
dollar, it would be economically disastrous causing trade to
plummet, GDP to fall and unemployment levels and
bartering to surge. Bitcoin is an experiment that needs to
remain in the laboratory until it can meet the basic
standards required to become a beneficial transactional
currency. As a virtual commodity, Bitcoin remains
extremely risky and needs to be closely watched. To
transform Bitcoin into a virtual currency would require
regulation, centralization, creation of a legal framework
and strong regulatory oversight. However, these steps
alone would not necessarily guarantee that chronically high
price volatility would drop low enough to allow Bitcoin to
become a trusted transactional currency.112
J. International & Jurisdictional Issues
[45] The international reach and clientele of those engaged in virtual
currency transactions present obvious law enforcement compliance
problems. Mythili Raman states that “transnational organized crime
networks are increasingly involved in cybercrime, and can imperil
consumers’ faith in emerging digital systems” and “[i]nvestigations into
illicit virtual currency businesses therefore often require considerable
Towards Risk Scoring of Bitcoin Transactions, available at
http://fc14.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/bitcoin14_submission_15.pdf.
112

Mark T. Williams, supra note 14 at 1.

39

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

cooperation from international partners.”113 The investigation and
takedown of Liberty Reserve, involved coordination of the law
enforcement agencies in 17 nations.114
[46] The practical inability to obtain customer transaction records
remains one of the most significant problems confronting law enforcement
efforts:
Because decentralized systems lack any sort of
administering authority to collect user information or
receive legal process, investigators must rely on
information collected by other sources, such as exchangers.
Even if the target used a centralized system or exchanger,
however, accurate customer records may still be difficult to
obtain, or may not exist at all.115
[47] Incongruent regulatory schemes present difficulty in regulating
transactions and technology that appear to move at the speed of light.116
113

Raman, supra note 8. See generally Joel Reidenberg, Technology and Internet
Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA L. REV. 1951 (2005) (discussing the struggle to adapt existing
regulatory standards to new technologies and the Internet).
114

See Raman, supra note 8.

115

Id. See generally Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International
Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 1), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 176 (2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496847 (discussing the increasing complexity of data
protection law); Christopher Kuner, Data Protection Law and International Jurisdiction
on the Internet (Part 2), 18 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 227 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689495 (examining international jurisdiction and its
relationship to data protection law).
116

See generally Gargi Rajvanshi, Tapas K. Badhyopadhyay & Rajeev Gupta, Intricacies
of Privacy Protection in Electronic Commercial Transactions: Critical Analysis (April 9,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2036935 (analyzing the issue of data
protection and privacy as it relates to electronic transactions); Franziska Boehm &
Paulina Pesch, Bitcoin: A First Legal Analysis – With Reference to German & USAmerican Law (2014), available at
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Virtual currencies, which facilitate the movement of money across the
globe without involving a traditional financial services institution, exist in
a legal and regulatory environment that may not address virtual currencies
at all.117 Those countries having substandard anti-money laundering or
know-your-customer regulatory oversight or those jurisdictions hostile to
the United States attract these illicit operations.
Even in those
jurisdictions having a cooperative regulatory environment, “the legal
process for obtaining foreign records is relatively slow when compared to
the near-instantaneous speed at which the virtual currency user can send
the funds to another jurisdiction.”118
K. Anonymity Due to Encryption
[48] The link between sophisticated encryption and virtual currency
presents yet another difficult technical challenge for regulators,
investigators, and others in the enforcement process such as
prosecutors.119 Because virtual currencies lack a centralized authority for
administration (such as a central bank or financial institution), the
decentralized command and control functions of a virtual currency rely
typically on an encryption algorithm.120 Therefore, “[t]hese encryptionhttp://fc14.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/bitcoin14_submission_7.pdf (observing that current laws
are not designed to handle decentralized virtual currencies like Bitcoin and that the
criminal and civil law systems in Germany particularly are not prepared for the
challenges arising outside the traditional understanding of physically existent objects).
117

See Niels Vandezande, Mobile Wallets and Virtual Alternative Currencies Under the
EU Legal Framework on Electronic Payments, ICRI Working Paper 16 (Sept. 12, 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325410; D.C. Kennedy, In Search of a Balance
Between Police Power and Privacy in the Cybercrime Treaty, 9 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3
(2002), at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v9il/article3.html. See generally Raman, supra note 8
(discussing law enforcement interests related to virtual currencies).
118

Raman, supra note 8.

119

See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 23 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 416, 453 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960602.
120

See Raman, supra note 8.

41

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

based currencies, also known as cryptocurrencies, lack a central
administering authority that might otherwise possess valuable evidence.
In addition, users of these currencies often encrypt their digital wallets,
complicating our efforts to seize and forfeit criminal proceeds.”121
Moreover,
To be clear, virtual currency is not necessarily synonymous
with anonymity. A convertible virtual currency with
appropriate anti-money laundering and know-yourcustomer controls, as required by U.S. law, can safeguard
its system from exploitation by criminals and terrorists in
the same way any other money services business could. As
virtual currency systems develop, it is imperative to law
enforcement interests that those systems comply with
applicable anti-money laundering and know-your-customer
controls.122
IV. BITCOIN
[49] Based on ideas from b-money123 and Hashcash,124 “[a] Bitcoin is a
fixed-value cryptographic object represented as a chain of digital

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

Joshua A. Kroll, Ian C. Davey, & Edward W. Felten, The Economics of Bitcoin
Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries, THE TWELFTH WORKSHOP ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY (WEIS 2013) 3, available at
http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf (citing
Wei Dai, b-money, http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt (1998) (last visited May 13,
2014).).
124

See Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 3 (citing Adam Back, Hashcash - A
Denial of Service Counter-Measure, HASHCASH.ORG (Aug. 1, 2002),
http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf).
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signatures over the transactions in which the coin was used.”125 Bitcoin
“aims to be completely distributed, free of central authorities or points of
control, and at least somewhat anonymous.”126 Bitcoin is a virtual
currency based on a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) network, much like
BitTorrent, the popular protocol for sharing files over the Internet, such as
music, games and video.127 Boston University’s Mark Williams observes
that “[s]ince 2009, over seventy-five virtual currencies have been created
and are traded globally representing about $11 billion in stated market
value.”128 As shown in Figure 2, Bitcoin has grown rapidly since 2009
from a mere idea to a legitimate currency by mid-2013, with bitcoins in
circulation, its market capitalization having total value in excess of $14
billion (U.S.) during December 2013.129 One 2013 estimate states that
125

Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 3; see also Robert McMillan, The Fierce
Battle for the Soul of Bitcoin, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/03/what-is-bitcoin.
126

Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 3.

127

See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 42-43 (Oct. 2012),
available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf. See
generally Rostislav Skudnov, Bitcoin Clients, TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES
1,
http://publications.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/47166/Skudnov_Rostislav.pdf?sequ
ence=1 (exploring the different features of Bitcoin); David Allen Bronleewe, Bitcoin
NFC, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 1,
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/ETD-UT-2011-084150/BRONLEEWE-MASTERS-REPORT.pdf?sequence=1 (discussing the use of
Bitcoin).
128

Williams, supra note 14, at 1 (citing Crypto-Currency Market Capitalizations,
COINMARKETCAP, http://coinmarketcap.com/mineable.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014)).
129

Bitcoin Market Capitalization, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/charts/marketcap?timespan=all&showDataPoints=false&daysAverageString=1&show_header=true&s
cale=0&address (last visited (Apr. 16, 2014). See generally Robin Teigland, Zeynep
Yetis & Tomas Larsson, Breaking Out of the Bank in Europe - Exploring Collective
Emergent Institutional Entrepreneurship Through Bitcoin, SWEDISH NETWORK FOR
EUROPEAN STUDIES IN ECONOMICS & BUSINESS, at 3, available at
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Bitcoin transactions reportedly average about 30 transactions per minute,
contrasted with about 200,000 transactions per minute for VISA.130
Figure 2: Bitcoin Market Capitalization131

[50] By Thanksgiving of 2013, an increase in media attention and
publicity surrounding U.S. Senate hearings resulted in Bitcoin increasing
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2263707 (discussing the implications of the rapid growth of
Bitcoin).
130

François R. Velde, Chicago Fed Letter, Bitcoin: A Primer, 317 THE FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2013/cfldecem
ber2013_317.pdf.
131

BLOCKCHAIN.INFO, https://blockchain.info/charts/market-cap (last visited Sept. 11,
2014).
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in value during one seven-day period from $615 per Bitcoin to more than
$1,000 per Bitcoin on the Mt. Gox exchange, resulting in a total market
capitalization in excess of $11 billion in US dollars.132 Figure 3 illustrates
the volatility of Bitcoin market price in US dollars during 2013, and
through mid-February 2014.133 On Tuesday, February 24, 2014, following
the failure of the online marketplace, the price of Bitcoin, in what must be
regarded as "an astonishing price recovery immediately following bad
news," stood at $525 per Bitcoin, not far from where it was when the Mt.
Gox news emerged on Monday night.134

132

See Nick Bilton, N.Y. Times Bits: A Surge in Value for Bitcoin and Currencies Similar
to It, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 27, 2013, 4:16 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/a-rise-in-attention-and-price-for-cryptocurrencies/?_r=0; see also Marie Brière, Kim Oosterlinck & Ariane Szafarz, Virtual
Currency, Tangible Return: Portfolio Diversification with Bitcoins (Working Paper, Sept.
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324780.
133

Bitcoin Market Price in US Dollars, BLOCKCHAIN, available at
https://blockchain.info/charts/market-price (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
134

Hiroko Tabuchi & Ben Protess, Bitcoin Investors See Bright Side in Site’s Failure,
INT’L N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at 15, available at
http://ihtbd.com/ihtuser/print/old%20THT/27-02-2014/a2702x15xxxxxxxxx.pdf.
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Figure 3: Bitcoin Market Price135
(0,000,000s omitted)

[51] Approximately 90% ($10 billion) of the total virtual currency
market value is represented by Bitcoin; but, “[b]ased on its volatile price
behavior, Bitcoin is not a virtual currency but a high-risk virtual
commodity, in a hyper-asset bubble that has begun to pop” and “Bitcoin
the pseudo currency and Bitcoin the low-cost payment system are
dependent on each other and inseparable.”136 Barber, Boyen, Shi, and
135

BLOCKCHAIN.INFO, supra note 131.

136

Williams, supra note 14, at 1; see also id. at n. 2 (observing “Bitcoin is the e uivalent
of the locomotive while the payment system is the rails that allow it to move. If the
engine does not work no matter how well built the rails, they won’t be used.”). See
generally George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money (Univ. of Ga. Dept. of Econ.,
Working Paper, Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000118
(discussing Bitcoin as a synthetic commodity currency); David Groshoff, Kickstarter My
Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowdfunding Constraints
and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313396 (proposing a re-regulatory scheme that may provide a
solution to combat the excessive volatility of Bitcoin bubbles); Joseph Chen-Yu Wang, A
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Uzun observe that “Bitcoin assumes that the majority of nodes in its
network are honest, and resorts to a majority vote mechanism for double
spending avoidance, and dispute resolution. In contrast, most e-cash
schemes require a centralized bank who is trusted for purposes of e-cash
issuance, and double-spending detection.”137 Hammad Siddiqi contends
that the market for Bitcoin is a “complex system without a stable
equilibrium.”138
[52] Bitcoin was created during 2009 by Satoshi Nakamoto, believed by
many to be a pseudonymous hacker or hackers.139 Moreover
Nakamoto was inspired by an article written back in 1998
by Wei Dai, a graduate from the University of Washington.
Dai envisioned a system in which “untraceable
pseudonymous entities . . . [could] cooperate with each
other more efficiently, by providing them with a medium of
exchange and a method of enforcing contracts.” He sought
to create a medium of exchange that avoided the need for
Simple Macroeconomic Model of Bitcoin (Bitquant Research Laboratories, Working
Paper No. 1, Feb. 11, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2394024 (suggesting
that bitcoin will not fall victim to the liquidity trap suggested by some economists).
137

Simon Barber, Xavier Boyen, Elaine Shi & Ersin Uzun, Bitter to Better Ho to
Make Bitcoin a Better Currency, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY;
16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FC 2012 399, 400 (Angelos D. Keromytis ed.,
2012), available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/~xb/fc12/bitcoin.pdf.
138

Hammad Siddiqi, The Routes to Chaos in the Bitcoins Market, (Working Paper, Feb.
17, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2396997.
139

See Barber, Boyen, Shi & Uzun, supra note 137, at 1. But see Julianne Pepitone,
Bitcoin Creator Satoshi Nakamoto Found, Newsweek Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/bitcoin-creator-satoshi-nakamoto-foundnewsweek-says-n45871 (identifies 64-year-old California resident as the author), and
Nathaniel Popper & Rachel Abrams, Bitcoin’s Mysterious Creator Is Said to Be
Identified, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014, 3:51 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/newsweek-unmasks-bitcoin-founder-stirringire/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (raising doubts about the Newsweek report).
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intermediaries in electronic transactions, and one in which
government involvement “[was] not [only] temporarily
destroyed but permanently forbidden and permanently
unnecessary. ”
Drawing on Dai’s vision, Nakamoto created Bitcoin, the
world’s first private, decentralized digital currency. Unlike
traditional fiat currencies, whose value is determined by
law and underwritten by the state, Bitcoin is not backed by
a government or legal entity. Bitcoin does not have a
central authority in charge of the money supply or a central
clearing house. Indeed, no traditional financial institutions
are involved in Bitcoin transactions. Instead, users perform
all steps of the transactions themselves.140
A. How Bitcoin Works
[53] Bitcoin can be described as a “Proof-of-Work (PoW) based
currency that allows users to generate digital coins by performing
computations.”141 Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir report that “[p]articipants
begin using bitcoin by first acquiring a program called a Bitcoin wallet

140

Nicholas Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin Within the Reach
of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377, 383 (2013) (quoting Morgen Peck, Bitcoin: The
Cryptoanarchists’ Ans er to Cash, IEEE Spectrum (June 2012), available at
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/bitcoin-the-cryptoanarchists-answer-to-cash
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014); Wei Dai, B-Money (1998), http://weidai.com/bmoney.txt
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014)); see also EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 6;
J.P., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, THE ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency (last viewed Apr. 14,
2014).
141

Elli Androulaki, Ghassan O. Karame, Marc Roeschlin, Tobias Scherer & Srdjan
Capkun, Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA
SECURITY; 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FC 2013 34, 34 (Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
ed., 2013), available at
http://book.itep.ru/depository/bitcoin/User_privacy_in_bitcoin.pdf.
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and one or more Bitcoin addresses.”142 Stored on a computer’s hard drive
as electronic files, Bitcoins “can be accumulated or transferred just like an
e-mail. Software algorithms embedded in the online Bitcoin network
protect against fraud and ensure that the files are not counterfeited.”143 By
using a peer-to-peer network to distribute a master transparent public
ledger called the Blockchain, each Bitcoin transaction is registered for all
to see. The Blockchain is used to verify that the identical Bitcoins haven’t
been used in a previous transaction, thereby preventing “double spending”
of the same Bitcoins.144 Brito and Castillo observe
[T]ransactions on the Bitcoin network are not denominated
in dollars or euros or yen as they are on PayPal, but are
instead denominated in bitcoins. This makes it a virtual
currency in addition to a decentralized payments network.
The value of the currency is not derived from gold or
government fiat, but from the value that people assign to it.
142

Dorit Ron & Adi Shamir, Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Transaction
Graph, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY; 17TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE, FC 2013 6, 8 (Ahmad-Reza Sageghi ed., 2013), available at
https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf.
143

Plassaras, supra note 140, at 379. See generally Jӧrg Becker, Dominic Breuker,
Tobias Heide, Justus Holler, Hans Peter Rauer & Rainer Bӧhme, Can We Afford Integrity
by Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by the Bitcoin Currency (Workshop on the
Economics of Information Security WEIS 2012 Working Paper, Feb. 24, 2012), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041492 (discussing the intricacies of the Bitcoin system);
Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency
(Harv. L. Sch. Seminar “The Constitutional Law of Money” Working Paper, May 8,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294124 (discussing the complex Bitcoin
technology).
144

Jerry Brito & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers, George Mason
University Mercatus Center 4 (Dec. 19, 2013). But see Nicolas Houy, It Will Cost You
Nothing to 'Kill' a Proof-of-Stake Crypto-Currency 2, 4 (University of Lyon-GATE
Working Paper, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393940. But see generally
Androulaki et al., supra note 141 (describing several authors who contend that doublespending attacks can be successful).
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The dollar value of a bitcoin is determined on an open
market, just as is the exchange rate between different world
currencies.145
[54] Worldwide in scope, Bitcoin “can be used as a currency for all
kinds of transactions (for both virtual and real goods and services), thereby
competing with official currencies . . . [However,] it does not have a
central clearing house, nor are there any financial or other institutions
involved in the transactions.”146 Bitcoin exists with “no central authority
in charge of the money supply [since] . . . the money supply is determined
by a specific type of [data] ‘mining’ activity. It depends on the amount of
resources (electricity and CPU time) that ‘miners’ devote to solving
specific mathematical problems.”147
The Bitcoin mining process
“involves repeatedly running a computationally intensive mathematical
function (called a cryptographic hash function) on a set of randomly
seeded inputs until a specific pattern pops up. . . . The results are
publicized on the Internet for the rest of the Bitcoin network.” 148 At the
time of writing, March 2014, the Bitcoin network hash rate (total number
of hashes per second made by all players) is estimated to be in the
neighborhood of 30,000 trillion hashes per second (30,000 Thash/s),
having increased at an astonishing rate due to “more efficient specialized
mining hardware now available on the market.”149 At this rate, Bitcoin

145

Brito & Castillo, supra note 144, at 4.

146

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 21; see also Marc Pilkington, Bitcoin
and Complexity Theory: Some Methodological Implications (University of Burgundy
Working Paper, Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340007
(investigating the foundations of Bitcoin).
147

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 21.

148

Paul Ford, Marginally Useful, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.technologyreview.com/review/524691/marginally-useful.
149

E-mail from Edward W. Felten, Robert E. Kahn Professor of Computer Science and
Public Affairs & Director, Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton
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has become one of the largest distributed computational efforts ever. Over
a year earlier, with a hash rate of less than 1% the current rate, Kroll,
Davey and Felten observed that “taken as a whole, the Bitcoin transaction
verification network is more powerful than the combined computing
power of the top 500 supercomputers in the world, giving pause to anyone
concerned about whether the costs of transaction verification in Bitcoin
are acceptable.”150 I have written this article to be readable by those not
possessing an advanced degree in computer science. Therefore, while I
present minimal math, a wealth of cryptographic rich research is
available.151 Babaioff, Dobzinski, Oren and Zohar present the following
account:
University, to Lawrence J. Trautman (March 6, 2014) (on file with author); see also
Bitcoin Hash Rate, BLOCKCHAIN, available at http://blockchain.info/charts/hash-rate.
150

Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 8.

151

See generally Androulaki, supra note 141 (analyzing the privacy guarantees of Bitcoin
in a setting where Bitcoin is used as a primary currency for daily transactions of
individuals); Marcin Andrychowicz et al., Secure Multiparty Comnputations on Bitcoin
(2014), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/784 (showing how the unique properties of
Bitcoin can be used in the area of secure multiparty computation protocols (MPCs));
Marcin Andrychowicz et al., Fair Two-Party Computations Via Bitcoin Deposits (2014),
available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/837 (explaining how Bitcoin can be used to
obtain fairness in a two-party secure computation protocol); Marcin Andrychowicz et al.,
How to Deal With Malleability of BitCoin Transactions (2013), available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.3230 (discussing the malleability of Bitcoin transactions);
Moshe Babaioff et al., On Bitcoin and Red Balloons, ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce (EC’12) (2012), available at
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~avivz/pubs/12/Bitcoin_EC0212.pdf (proposing a modification
to the Bitcoin protocol to help eliminate various problems with the virtual currency
scheme); Alex Coventry, NooShare: A Decentralized Ledger of Shared Computational
Resources (2012), available at http://web.mit.edu/alex_c/www/nooshare.pdf (describing
NooShare, a decentralized ledger similar to Bitcoin); Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer,
Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable, (forthcoming in Proceeds of the
18th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, March
2014), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243 (presenting an attack on the Bitcoin
protocol that would result in Bitcoin ceasing to be a decentralized currency); Ilja
Gerhardt & Timo Hanke, Homomorphic Payment Addresses and the Pay-to-Contract
Protocol (2012), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.3257 (proposing the design of a
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The basic setup of electronic transactions relies on public
key cryptography. When Alice wants to transfer 50 coins
to Bob, she signs a transaction using her private key.
Hence, everyone can verify that Alice herself initiated this
transaction (and not someone else). Bob, in turn, is
identified as the target of the transfer using his public key.
For the money to be actually transferred from Alice’s
account to Bob’s account, some entity has to keep track of
the last owner of the coins, and to mark Bob as the new
owner. Otherwise, Alice could “double spend” her money.
First transfer the coins to Bob, then transfer the same coins
again to Charlie. Traditionally, this role was fulfilled by
banks. In return, banks tended to charge high fees, for
example in international transfers.152
[55] A report by the European Central Bank states that “[b]itcoins are
divisible to eight decimal places enabling their use in any kind of
transaction, regardless of the value. . . . [T]ransactions are carried out
faster and more cheaply than with traditional means of payment.
Transaction fees, if any, are very low and no bank account fee is
charged.”153
Luther and Olson note that crypto-currency Bitcoin
“functions as a public record-keeping device. As such, it serves as an
deterministic bitcoin wallet); Fergal Reid & Martin Harrigan, An Analysis of Anonymity
in the Bitcoin System, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1107.4524 (investigating an
alleged theft of Bitcoins using various techniques); Ron & Shamir, supra note 142; Meni
Rosenfeld, Analysis of Hashrate-based Double-spending (2014), available at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.2009 (analyzing the stochastic processes of Bitcoin, which
underlie typical attacks and assessing the resulting probabilities of success); Emily Shen,
Elaine Shi & Brent Watters, Predicate Privacy in Encryption Systems (2008), available
at https://www.cs.umd.edu/users/elaine/docs/sympredenc.pdf (analyzing predicate
encryption).
152

Babaioff et al., supra note 151, at 16-17.

153

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 21.
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alternative to historically accepted monies while enabling transactions in
much the same way.”154 Teigland, Yetis, and Larsson report that “[a] deal
in December 2012 with French financial firms Aqoba and Credit Mutuel
led to Bitcoin-Central, a currency exchange, being awarded an
International Bank ID number and becoming a Payment Services Provider
e ual to services such as PayPal.”155
B. Bitcoin Vulnerabilities
[56] Any discussion of virtual currencies must acknowledge that any
such mathematically devised protocol is vulnerable to superior future
cryptography advances that trump our present understanding of the
boundaries of cybersecurity. Kroll, Davie, and Felten observe that
“[s]uccess of the Bitcoin economy re uires that Bitcoin’s distributed
protocols operate and remain stable.”156 Assuming that those involved
behave as incentivized and in their own perceived best interest, three types
of consensuses are required (each depending mutually on the other two)
for Bitcoin to remain a success:
1. Consensus about Rules: Players must agree on criteria to
determine which transactions are valid.
Only valid
154

William J. Luther & Josiah Olson, Bitcoin is Memory 2 (Kenyon College Working
Paper, June 7, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2275730.
155

Teigland et al., supra note 129, at 3.

156

Kroll, Davey & Felten,, supra note 123, at 6; see also Mitsuru Iwamura, Yukinobu
Kitamura & Tsutomu Matsumoto, Is Bitcoin the Only Cryptocurrency in the Town?
Economics of Cryptocurrency and Fredrich A. Hayek 12 (Hitotsubashi University
Institute of Economic Research Working Paper, Feb. 28, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405790 (concluding that Bitcoin will be taken over by other
cryptocurrencies with similar but somewhat improved technical as well as security
structures); Tetsuya Saito, Bitcoin: A Search-Theoretic Approach, INT’L J. INNOVATION
IN THE DIGITAL ECON. 16 (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405013 (assessing the stability of Bitcoin in the market as a
payment method).
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transactions will be memorialized in the Bitcoin log; but
this requires agreement on how to determine validity.
2. Consensus about State: Players must agree on which
transactions have actually occurred, that is, they must agree
on the history of the Bitcoin economy, so that there is a
common understanding of who owns which coin at any
given time.
3. Consensus that Bitcoins are Valuable: Players must agree
that Bitcoins have value so that players will be willing to
accept Bitcoins in payment.157
[57] For purposes of our Bitcoin vulnerabilities discussion, I suggest
that the following issues are among the most significant threats: (1) the
51% attack, (2) The Goldfinger attack, (3) privacy concerns, and (4) loss
of confidence due to a significant decline in the price of Bitcoin resulting
in a disincentive to mine. Many other potential threats exist such as: a
deflationary spiral; denial-of-service attacks; or hoarding of Bitcoin due to
its appreciation potential.158
[58] Among attacks intended to “destabilize consensus about the rules
or state of Bitcoin,”159 the 1% attack arises when Bitcoin’s miners (or a
single individual or cartel acting in concert) hold a majority of the
network’s capacity for puzzle-solving (mining).160 This is a known design
157

Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 6.

158

See Barber, Boyen, Shi & Uzun, supra note 137, at 6; and Marie Vasek, Micah
Thornton & Tyler Moore, Empirical Analysis of Denial-of-Service Attacks in the Bitcoin
Ecosystem 1, available at http://fc14.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/bitcoin14_submission_17.pdf.
159

Kroll, Davey & Felten, supra note 123, at 11.

160

See Barber, Boyen, Shi & Uzun, supra note 137, at 6. See also Vasek et al., supra
note 158, at 11; See also Philipp Güring & Ian Grigg, Bitcoin & Gresham’s La – The
Economic Inevitability of Collapse 5 (Oct.-Dec. 2011), available at
http://iang.org/papers/BitcoinBreachesGreshamsLaw.pdf (contending that botnets can
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problem because the Bitcoin developers made the assumption that an
effective cartel of miners would never develop. Kroll et al.. observe:
[A] cartel can change any rules which are enforced by
consensus and players who are not in the cartel will likely
be obliged to follow. . . An interesting facet of mining
cartels is that they can censor certain transactions. The
cartel can choose to ignore any transaction it does not want
appended to the log . . . [However,] a 51% cartel attack is
unlikely to generate enough reward within the Bitcoin
economy to be worthwhile to the attacker.161
[59] In a highly controversial paper, Cornell University computer
scientists Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer warn that “[t]he Bitcoin
ecosystem is open to manipulation, and potential takeover by miners
seeking to maximize their rewards . . . [because] [h]igher revenues can
lead new rational miners to join selfish miner pools, leading to a collapse
of the decentralized currency.”162 Eyal and Gün Sirer further contend that
operate at a zero cost of power- therefore, stolen electricity will drive out honest mining,
resulting in inevitable collapse of Bitcoin).
161

Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 11-13.

162

Eyal & Gün Sirer, supra note 151 at 15. Compare Ed Felton, Game Theory and
Bitcoin, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 11, 2013), https://freedom-totinker.com/blog/felton/game-thory-and-bitcoin/ (disagreeing with the findings of the Eyal
and Gün Sirer paper), and Ed Felton, Bitoin Isn’t So Broken After All, FREEDOM TO
TINKER (Nov. 7, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felton/bitcoin-inst-so-brokenafter-all (finding contrary to the Eyal and Gün Sirer paper that a group of minors will not
be stable) with Eyal & Gün Sirer, Response to Feedback on Selfish Mining, HACKING
DISTRIBUTED (Nov. 14, 2013, 9:45 AM),
https://hackingdistributed.com/2013/11/14/response-to-feedback-on-selfish-mining and
E-mail from Ittay Eyal, post-doc, Systems and Networking Group. Dep’t of Computer
Science, Cornell University to Lawrence J. Trautman (Mar. 10, 2014, 7:58 CST) (on file
with author) (contending Felton’s main comment arises from a misunderstanding of a
blog post published by Eyal & Gün Sirer and not with the actual paper). But cf., Arvind
Narayanan & Andrew Miler, Why the Cornell Paper on Bitcoin Mining is Important,
FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 9, 2013), https://freedom-to-
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[T]he upper bound on threshold size is 1/3: the protocol
will never be safe against attacks by a selfish mining pool
that commands more than 33% of the total mining power of
the network. This upper bound is substantially lower than
the 50% figure currently assumed, and difficult to achieve
in practice.163
[60] The Goldfinger attack is named after the James Bond novel by Ian
Flemming and movie of the same name. The novel’s villain attempts to
ruin the gold-backed U.S. currency by causing the underlying gold held at
Fort Knox to become radioactive and therefore worthless.164 Accordingly,
in a Bitcoin Goldfinger attack, a 51% majority of miners seeks to “destroy
the Bitcoin economy in order to achieve utility outside the Bitcoin
economy.”165 Kroll et al. identify at least three potential (and expensive)
motivations for such an attack: (1) a sovereign or institution may
determine to disrupt Bitcoin for its own purposes (2) attack by a non-state
actor (public protest such as an Occupy Bitcoin, etc.); and (3) an attacker
may be motivated by an investment gain such as one derived by sellingshort the underlying Bitcoin and closing the position at a gain.166

tinker.com/blog/randomwalker/why-the-cornell-paper-on-bitcoin-mining-is-important/
(observing that Eyal & Gün Sirer's paper is the first time a serious issue has been raised
with Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism and has exploited the peer-to-peer aspect of the
system).
163

Eyal & Gün Sirer, supra note 151 at 3.

164

IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER (Thomas & Mercer 2012); see also GOLDFINGER (Eon
Productions 1964).
165

Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 13.

166

Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 13 (citing J. Becker et al., Can We Afford Integrity by
Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by the Bitcoin Currency, in WORKSHOP ON THE
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY(2012) (emphasizing proposition two i.e. nonstate actors)).
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[61] Privacy concerns constitute another significant threat to the future
viability of Bitcoin. Research conducted by Androulaki, Karame,
Roeschlin, Scherer and Capkun find:
[T]he current measures adopted by Bitcoin are not enough
to protect the privacy of users if Bitcoin were to be used as
a digital currency in realistic settings . . . [I]f Bitcoin is
used as a digital currency to support the daily transactions
of users in a typical university environment, then behaviorbased clustering techniques can unveil, to a large extent,
the profiles of 40% of Bitcoin users, even if these users try
to enhance their privacy by manually creating new
addresses.167
[62] The last on our abbreviated list of selected threats lies in the
potential “death spiral”168 that will likely be created if the price of Bitcoin
declines to a point where there is no longer an economic incentive to mine
167

Androulaki et al., supra note 141 at 15. See also Joseph Bonneau et al., Mixcoin
Anonymity for Bitcoin with Accountable Mixes, Financial Cryptography & Data
Conference (Mar. 307, 2014), available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/077 (last updated
April 21, 2014) (proposing a protocol to facilitate anonymous payments utilizing the
Bitcoin system); Philip Koshy, Diana Koshy & Patrick McDaniel, An Analysis of
Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic, Financial Cryptography & Data
Conference (Mar. 3-7, 2014), available at
http://ifca.ai/fc14/papers/fc14_submission_71.pdf; (developing "heuristics for identifying
ownership relationships between Bitcoin addresses and IP addresses"); Malte Möser,
Anonymity of Bitcoin Transactions: An Analysis of Mixing Services, Münster Bitcoin
Conference (July 17-18, 2013), https://www.wi.unimuenster.de/sites/default/files/public/department/itsecurity/mbc13/mbc13-moeserpaper.pdf (examining three types of services that claim to increase Bitcoin anonymity);
Michele Spagnuolo, Frederico Maggi & Stefano Zanero, BitIodine: Extracting
Intelligence from the Bitcoin Network, Financial Cryptography & Data Conference (Mar.
3-7, 2014), available at http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_11.pdf(presenting
BitIodine, a modular framework that can be used to build a library for more complex
Bitcoin forensic analysis tools).
168

Kroll et al., supra note 123 at 8.
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additional Bitcoin. For a currency of any type to maintain value it must
sustain confidence in its ability to serve as a store of value. Kroll, Davey,
and Felten depict the following scenario:
[L]oss of confidence in Bitcoin could cause the Bitcoin
price to go down, a falling price lowers the incentive to
mine and the equilibrium mining rate, lower mining rate
leads to the currency being easier to subvert, and this leads
to a further loss of confidence in the currency. Such a
death spiral reflects the perceived loss of consensus in the
value game . . .169
C. The Promise of Bitcoin
[63] Brito and Castillo in their report, Bitcoin: A Primer for
Policymakers, highlight the many ways in which Bitcoin may be used to
“improve the uality of life for the world’s poorest. Improving access to
basic financial services is a promising antipoverty techni ue.”170 The
authors state “[t]o better understand why people might want to use
Bitcoin, it helps to think of it, not necessarily as a replacement for
traditional currencies, but rather as a new payments system.” 171 The lower
cost of Bitcoin assists small businesses by providing an alternative to
expensive credit cards, enabling migrants to make cheaper remittances of
payments to their families in developing countries, helping to protect
individuals from censorship and capital controls, providing oppressed
groups with financial privacy, and facilitating innovation and
micropayments.172
169

Id.

170

Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 14, (citing MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE
POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY (Public Affairs,
2003).
171

Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 10.

172

See, e.g., id. at 10-16.
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D. Lower Transaction Costs
[64] Bitcoin offers the promise of substantially lower transaction costs
for small merchants worldwide. Because Bitcoin transactions do not
involve a third party (financial intermediary or institution), costly credit
card charges are avoided.
Credit cards have greatly expanded the ease of transacting,
but their use comes with considerable costs to merchants.
Businesses that wish to offer the option of credit card
payments to their customers must first pay for a merchant
account with each credit card company. Depending on the
terms of agreement with each credit card company,
businesses must then pay a variety of authorization fees,
transaction fees, statement fees, interchange fees, and
customer-service fees, among other charges.173
Bitcoin makes lower transaction costs possible, thus enabling (1) financial
services to those populations currently without access to financial services,
and (2) a multitude of micropayment services. In addition, the ability to
173

Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 10. See generally Wilko Bolt, Retail Payment
Systems: Competition, Innovation, and Implications (De Nederlandsche Bank, Working
Paper No. 362, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2192046 (assessing key
factors that affect pricing, competition, and incentives to innovate in the payment
market); Marc Bourreau & Marianne Verdier, Interchange Fees and Innovation in
Payment Systems, (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244160 (analyzing the
impact of interchange fees on consumers' and merchants' incentives to adopt a payment
instrument); David S. Evans et al., Interchange Fees: The Economics and Regulation of
What Merchants Pay for Cards, (Dec. 17, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974023 (examining the economics and regulation of
interchange fees); David S. Evans, Payments Innovation and Interchange Fees
Regulation: How Inverting the Merchant-Pays Business Model Would Affect the Extent
and Direction of Innovation (June 27, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1878825 (examining the possible impact of a reduction in
interchange fees on innovation involving payment cards).
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make the transfer of funds available with lower transaction costs bodes
well for global poverty reduction “by improving access to capital.”174
E. Remittances
[65] One of the major potential benefits provided by Bitcoin may be in
the marketplace for remittances sent by immigrants in developed countries
(where the jobs are) to their relatives back home in developing countries.
According to World Bank estimates, “remittances totalled [sic] USD 440
billion in 2010, of which USD 325 billion went to developing countries,
involving some 192 million migrants or 3.0% of world population. For
some individual recipient countries, remittances can be as high as a third
of GDP.”175 The World Bank reports that “[r]emittance prices are high for
many reasons, including underdeveloped financial infrastructure in some
countries, limited competition, regulatory obstacles, lack of access to the
banking sector by remittance senders and/or receivers, and difficulties for
migrants to obtain the necessary identification documentation to enter the
financial mainstream.”176 In addition,
[T]he single most important factor leading to high
remittance prices is lack of transparency in the market. It is
difficult for consumers to compare prices because there are
several variables that compose remittance prices. Prices for
remittances are frequently made up of a fee charged for
sending a certain amount, a margin taken on the exchange
rate when remittances are paid and received in different
currencies, and, at times, a fee charged to the recipient of
174

Brito & Castillo, supra note 144 at 10.

175

Remittance Market Outlook, Financial & Private Sector Development, WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/0,
,contentMDK:22121552~menuPK:6127416~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:2
82885~isCURL:Y,00.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
176

Id.
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the funds. These fee components may also vary according
to how the receiver is paid (i.e. cash or by creating an
account), the speed of the transfer, and the ability of the
sender to provide information about the recipient (i.e. bank
account number).
In addition, a lack of transparency in the market has had the
impact of reducing competition, as consumers tend to
patronize traditional market players because they are not
aware of other players, and/or cannot compare the services
they usually buy against other product.177
[66] The average cost of remitting funds during the 4th quarter of 2013
from G20 nations is reported by the World Bank to be 8.16%, contrasted
with a cost of 12.33% for using a commercial bank to send funds.178 The
cost of using post offices stands at 4.12% for the same time period; cash
products are among the least expensive averaging 7.3 %; and “[a]ccountto-account products are among the most expensive, with an average cost
of 12.74 percent; however, the cost of transferring money within the same
bank or to a partner bank is significantly lower.”179 The cost of remitting
funds varies widely from country to country with Italy, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States below the average cost found among G8
countries of 8.20 percent during the 4th quarter of 2013.180 Of particular
note, “South Africa remains the costliest remittance sending country in the
G20 group, with an average of 18.16 [percent], followed by Japan with an
average of 15.73 percent. The least expensive sending country, together
177

Id.

178

World Bank, An Analysis of Trends in the Average Total Cost of Migrant Remittance
Services, 8 REMITTANCE PRICES WORLDWIDE 8, 2 (Dec. 2013), available at
https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/RPW_Report_Dec2013.pdf.
179

Id.

180

Id. at 5.
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with Russia, is Saudi Arabia (4.19 [percent]), followed by Korea (6.08
[percent]) and the USA (6.18 [percent]).”181 The market for remittances is
most troubling in Africa, as “[t]he Sub-Saharan Africa region remains the
most expensive region in the world to send money to, and has registered a
further increase from 12.29 in 3Q 2013 to 12. in Q 2013 . . .”182
F. Censorship, Human Rights, and Financial Privacy
[67] Daniel Solove writes, “[w]e are in the midst of an information
revolution, and we are only beginning to understand its implications. . . .
[W]e have undergone a dramatic transformation in the way we shop, bank,
and go about our daily business . . . .”183 Professor Jack Balkin observes
that “the most important decisions affecting the future of freedom of
speech will not occur in constitutional law; they will be decisions about
technological design, legislative and administrative regulations, the
formation of new business models, and the collective activities of endusers.”184 The interconnected culture of oppressive censorship, bribery,
corruption and extortion “is an amorphous cancer eating away at our
societies with the very real potential to destroy commerce between nations
and produce destructive global civil unrest.”185 Richard Alderman,
Director of the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) observes:
I have been following . . . the events of the Arab Spring
with the very greatest of interest. I have also been looking
181

Id. at 6.
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Id. at 8.
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Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Database and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001).
184

Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427,
427 (2009).
185

Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and Money - The
Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act, 47 INT’L LAW 481, 483 (2013) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276738.
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at what has been happening recently in India, China,
Russia, and other countries. When I look, in particular, at
the Arab Spring I see that corruption is one of the top issues
raised by the citizens of these countries as one of their main
grievances against the government or, indeed in some
cases, the former government. Some say that bribery is
part of the culture of those countries and that we must
respect it.
The citizens of those countries have
demonstrated very clearly to my mind that this is not part
of the culture that they are prepared to accept any longer.186
[68] Internet technology has gradually become a tool of dissidence in
repressed nations all over the world
to spread information, plan and

186

Id. at 483 (citing Richard Alderman, Director, U.K. Serious Fraud Office, Keynote
Address at the Risk Advisory Dinner (Oct. 5, 2011), transcript available at
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director's-speeches/speeches-2011/riskadvisory-dinner,-washington-dc.aspx).
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organize activists and conduct protests.187 Not surprisingly, repressive
regimes see the Internet as a threat.”188
[69] Bendrath and Mueller observe that technological advances “now
allow [I]nternet service providers to monitor the content of data packets in
real-time and make decisions about how to handle them. If deployed
widely this technology, known as deep packet inspection (DPI), has the
potential to alter basic assumptions that have underpinned Internet
governance to date.”189 Mina Rady presents an excellent account of how
187

See, e.g., Uyen P. Le, Online and Linked In: ‘Public Morals’ in the Human Rights and
Trade Networks, 38 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 107, 109 (2012); Antonio A. Casilli &
Paola Tubaro, Why Net Censorship in Times of Political Unrest Results in More Violent
Uprisings: A Social Simulation Experiment on the UK Riots 10 (Aug. 14, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909467; James D. Fielder, Dissent Versus the
(Online) Surveillance State: Measuring Authoritarian Control of the Internet 21, APSA
2011 Annual Meeting Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901908 (finding
while authoritarian regimes do have some success in mitigating Internet-driven dissent,
increasing Internet user bases ultimately reduce the ability of regimes to control online
communication); Philip N. Howard, Sheetal D. Agarwal & Muzammil M. Hussain, When
Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Regime Responses to the Political Uses of
Social Media 6 (Aug. 9, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1907191;
Muzammil M. Hussain & Philip Howard, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Information
Technologies and the Fuzzy Causes of the Arab Spring 3 & 12 (Mar. 27, 2012); Aleksey
Ponomarev, Balancing Internet Regulation and Human Rights (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990182; Courtney C. Radsch, Digital Dissidence & Political
Change: Cyberactivism and Citizen Journalism in Egypt 6-7, Doctoral Dissertion,
American University, School of International Service (Dec. 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379913.
188

Ramesh Subramananian, Commuications of the International Information
Management Association [CIIMA], The Growth of Global Internet Censorship and
Circumvention: A Survey, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 at 69 (2011), available at
http://www.iima.org/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&download
=331:the-growth-of-global-internet-censorship-and-circumvention-asurvey&id=56:2011-volume-11-issue-2&Itemid=68. See generally Derek E. Bambauer,
Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 378 (2009).
189

Ralf Bendrath & Milton Mueller, The End of the Net as We Know it? Deep Packet
Inspection and Internet Governance 1 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653259. See Hal Roberts, Ethan Zuckerman & John G.
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cyber-based assets have proven significant to citizen activists as they
organize against repressive regimes in Cairo, Egypt and Iran.190 In the
particular case of Egypt, Rady observes:
1. Social media played a critical role in calling for and
mobilizing for collective action (either via passive
strikes in 2008 or via active protests in 2011).
However, the impact of proxies and social networking
in January 2011 was [sic] critical sparks lead[ing] to the
subsequent events. With access to proxy channels,
Egyptian Internet users prolonged their communication
span, so that when Government decided to shut down
the Internet the situation had already worsened well
beyond [the] tipping point.
2. This case is that of a repressive regime that can no
longer enforce controls on the behavior of their citizens
given their use of a communication technology initially
based by a major power.191
G. Capital Controls
[70] Bitcoin has already proven to be an asset to those living in
countries having strict restrictions on the movement of Capital. Financial
Palfrey, 2011 Circumvention Tool Evaluation at 1-3 (Berkman Center Research
Publication No. 2011-08), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940455. See generally
Hadi Asghari, Michel Van Eeten & Milton Mueller, Unraveling the Economic and
Political Drivers of Deep Packet Inspection, GigaNet 7th Annual Symposium (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294434 (examining the role of economic and
political drivers of Deep Packet Inspection technology on typical use-cases).
190

See generally Rady, supra note 42 (discussing how anonymity networks have become
terrains for government-population conflict by enabling citizens to overpower the
government's conventional control mechanisms).
191

Id. at 14.
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and currency crises are a constant threat in many parts of the world.192
Graciela Kaminsky identifies ninety-six currency crises between January
1970 and February 2002 (pre sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007-08) in
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia,
Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Spain, Sweden, the Philippines,
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.193 Other scholars have
written about the impact of the Russian 1998 crisis on Latin American

192

See generally Graham Bird & Ramkishen S. Rajan, Restraining International Capital
Movements: What Does It Mean?(Centre for International Economic Studies, Working
Paper No. 0014, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=231207 (discussing Chile
and Malaysia's experiences with restraining capital movements); Benedict Clements &
Herman Kamil, Are Capital Controls Effective in the 21st Century? The Recent
Experience of Colombia (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/30,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0930.pdf (assessing
the effects of capital controls on capital flows and exchange rate dynamics in Colombia
in 2007); Kristin J. Forbes & Michael W. Klein, Pick Your Poison: The Choices and
Consequences of Policy Responses to Crises (MIT Sloan School, Working Paper No.
5062-13, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364457 (assessing the different
strategies employed by countries in responding to crises); Reuven Glick & Michael
Hutchison, Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Instability in Developing Economies
(Pacific Basin Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. PB00-05), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/pbcpapers/2000/pb00-05.pdf (investigating
whether legal restrictions on international capital flows are associated with greater
currency stability); Hiro Ito, Is Financial Openness a Bad Thing? An Analysis on the
Correlation Between Financial Liberalization and the Output Performance of Crisis-Hit
Economies, (Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper No. 04-23,
2004), available at http://sciie.ucsc.edu/workingpaper/2004/Ch3.pdf (investigating the
link between capital account openness and the output cost associated with a currency
crisis); Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises:
Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten (International Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. WP/13/266, 2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf (discussing the tools that
advanced countries should use to overcome economic crises).
193

Graciela Kaminsky, Varieties of Currency Crises 1 (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 10193, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10193.pdf.
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countries,194 and other examples of currency restrictions and lost
purchasing power.195 Nikoloski reports that it is the currency crisis, as
opposed to banking or sovereign debt crises, that most significantly
exacerbates the depth and incidence of poverty in the near term.196
[71] Argentina is but one example of the plight facing individuals
caught up in economic crisis.197 Scholars point to the uneasy lack of
194

Guillermo A. Calvo & Ernesto Talvi, Sudden Stop, Financial Factors and Economic
Collpase in Latin America: Learning from Argentina and Chile 1 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 11153, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11153.pdf.
195

See generally Pablo Bustelo, Capital Flows and Financial Crises: A Comparative
Analysis of East Asia (1997-98) and Argentina (2001-02) at 3 (Complutense University
of Madrid, Economics, Working Paper No. 2004-017, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=612784 (exploring financial crises in emerging economies;
specifically East Asia and Argentina); Wei Li, Dealing with Capital Flows: Thailand in
2006, (University of Virginia, Darden Case, Working Paper No. UVA-BP-0511, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1276570 (presenting a case that examines the
different policy choices faced by Thailand in 2006).
196

Zlatko Nikoloski, “Impact of Financial Crises on Poverty in Developing World: An
Empirical Approach,” (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701894.
197

See, e.g., Don’t Cry for Me Argentina: Economic Crises and the Restructuring of
Financial Property, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 771, 774 (2009); Nicolás
Cachanosky & Adrián O. Ravier, A Proposal of Monetary Reform for Argentina: Flexible
Dollarization and Free Banking (Jan. 13, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378541 (proposing a monetary reform for Argentina); Horacio
Spector; Enrique Alberola, Humberto López & Luis Servén, Tango with the Gringo: The
Hard Peg and Real Misalignment in Argentina (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 3322, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=610367; Werner Baer,
Pedro Elosegui & Andrés A. Gallo, The Achievements and Failures of Argentina's NeoLiberal Economic Policies (University of Illinois, Research, Working Paper No. 01-0114,
2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=279383; Gerard Caprio, Michael P. Dooley,
Danny Leipziger & Carl E. Walsh, The Lender of Last Resort Function Under a
Currency Board: The Case of Argentina (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper
No. 1648, 1996), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=620520; Guillermo Perry & Luis
Servén, The Anatomy of a Multiple Crisis: Why was Argentina Special and What Can We
Learn From It? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3081, 2003),
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“confidence in Argentina’s domestic currency and the banking sector due
to the continuous changes in regulations on interest rates and foreign
exchange markets as well as the forced conversions of bank deposits in
198 , 1989, and 2001 as triggers of runs against the [Argentine] peso.”198
Kaminsky, et al. observe that, “[t]he period from the mid-1970s to 2002
was as tumultuous as that of the earlier era and characterized by booms
and busts in international capital flows, crises, and failed stabilization
programs. During this period, Argentina had eight currency crises, four
banking crises, and two sovereign defaults.”199 Daniel Kostzer notes that
at the end of 2001, the Argentine government limited daily “money
withdrawals from the banking system to a maximum of 300 pesos (equal
to US$300 [sic]).”200 Hector Maletta reports:
At the end of 2001 . . . the Argentine President resigned,
the interim Government declared it would not continue
serving its debts, and a widespread economic crisis ensued.
The currency collapsed, banks were ordered to freeze
deposits, and the nation’s output fell . . . . The crisis also
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=636443; Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Argentina's
Pathway Through Financial Crisis (Rutgers School of Law-Newark Research, GEG,
Working Paper No. 2004/02, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=884225;
Augusto de la Torre, Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Sergio L. Schmukler, Living and Dying
with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina's Currency Board (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 2980, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=352380.
198

Graciela Kaminsky, Amine Mati & Nada Choueiri, Thirty Years of Currency Crises in
Argentina: External Shocks or Domestic Fragility? 8 (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 15478, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501503(citing M. Kiguel & P. Neumeyer, Seigniorage and
Inflation: The Case of Argentina, 27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 672 (1995).
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Id. at 1.
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Daniel Kostzer, Argentina: A Case Study on the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar
Desocupados, or the Employment Road to Economic Recovery 2 (Levy Economics
Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 534, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132772.
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caused a rise in joblessness to 26% in the wake of the
enormous contraction of consumption, investment and
output. After a decade of price stability, inflation returned
with a rise of 40.9% along 2002, especially during the first
half of the year, and a further 23.5% distributed along
2003-2005, . . . . Time deposits were kept frozen for a long
time, and those denominated in dollars were forcibly
converted to pesos at a loss (in dollars) of about one half of
their previous worth.201
These tragic developments meant those who had been assured by the
Argentine government “that a peso was as good as a dollar, suddenly
realized this was not the case. Not only a peso was not a dollar but . . .
people did not want to hold the Argentine Currency. Yet because deposits
were frozen, they were unable to dispose of unwanted pesos.”202 Thus, in
December 2001, “[a]ngry Argentines remembered how high inflation
during similar freezes in 1982 . . . and 1989 had robbed them of the real
value of their savings.”203
H. Innovation, Micropayments and Reducing World Poverty
[72] Innovation in financial markets will, as always, provide benefits
not now envisioned. Among recent developments, “a cloud culture fueled
by new media formats, mobile computing, and flash mobs has shifted the
global disruption out of the workplace and into the streets. . . . [and]
[d]isruptive innovations essentially redefine the value proposition for the
201

Hector E. Maletta, A Catastrophe Foretold: Economic Reform, Crisis, Recovery and
Employment in Argentina 1 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=903124.
202

Sebastian Edwards, The Great Exchange Rate Debate After Argentina 4 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9257, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=336373.
203

Steve H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler, What Went Wrong in Argentina?, CENTRAL
BANKING, Feb. 2002, at 43, 45, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2204682.
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customer.”204 During recent years, rapid technological change has
produced a significant increase in the use of mobile payments.205 As
William Luther observes, “the widespread adoption of smartphones [sic]
has made it easier to make and receive payments in person with electronic
bank accounts and digital wallets. More recently, the development of
inexpensive card-reading devices has enabled virtually anyone to accept
electronic payments.”206 Jon Garon writes:
Particularly in the area of payment systems, the
implications of network effects will have a highly
disintermediating impact. One particular payment system
will become more readily used than the others, and as more
objects can be purchased using that system, it will become
more valuable and disrupt other systems. . . .
Two competing networks drive network effects: the
network of consumers and the network of merchants. The
cost, convenience, social relevance, and network for the
merchant may have quite a different value proposition than
for the consumer. Merchants struggling to reduce the fees
204

Jon Garon, Mortgaging the Meme: Financing and Managing Disruptive Innovation,
10 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 441, 442-43 (2012).
205

See, e.g., Marc Bourreau & Marianne Verdier, Cooperation for Innovation in Payment
Systems: The Case of Mobile Payments, 79 COMM. & STRATEGIES 95 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810892. See generally Silvia Monica Elaluf-Calderwood,
Jonathan Liebenau & Patrik Karrberg, Privacy, Identity and Security Concerns:
Enterprise Strategic Decision Making and Business Model Development for Mobile
Payments in NFC 2 (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014205
(assessing the use of near field communications technology in the public transport
system); Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77 (2013)
(exploring the intersection of technology and consumer protection in the context of new
and emerging payment systems).
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William Luther, Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, and Switching Costs 3 (Mercatus
Center, George Mason University, Working Paper No. 13-17, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2295134.
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they pay to current credit card companies are motivated to
find less expensive alternatives, so some are promoting
competition. . . . In short, the battle over payment systems
will decide the future of the Fortune 100.207
It is clear that the challenges of reducing world poverty is intimately tied
to issues involving reducing the transaction costs of remittances and the
threat of capital/currency controls discussed above.208 In turn, issues of
global poverty are directly related to the propensity for outbreaks of civil
war and terrorism.209 Bracking and Sachikonye find:
[R]emittances are critical to household wellbeing in
Zimbabwe. . . . Indeed, it has become a commonplace in
the research area of migration and development, and its
subfield of poverty reduction and remittance studies, that
international migration can have a positive impact on
poverty reduction through the generation of migrant
remittances[,] and, for the vast majority of researchers, that
remittances are positively associated with economic
growth. Within international development, much hope has
been invested that remittances provide an accessible
pathway out of poverty, and an alternative to inter-

207

Garon, supra note 204, at 457.

208

See Robert L. Hutchings & Bart M.J. Szewczyk, The Global Future and Its Policy
Implications: Views from Leading Thinkers on Five Continents, The Atlantic Council of
the United States (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881953. See generally
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004) (exploring the use of
new technology to increase access to banking by low income individuals and
households).
209

See generally Susan Rice, Corinne Graff & Janet Lewis, Poverty and Civil War: What
Policymakers Need to Know (Brookings Global Economy and Development, Working
Paper No. 2, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015091 (questioning whether
there is a link between income poverty and the risk of civil war).
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I. Bitcoin in China
[73] During November 2013, China Daily reported that “China now
transacts half of the global Bitcoin volume and is a leader in pushing up
the exchange rate.”211 About a week later, China Daily observed that
“[a]n estimated 1.8 million Bitcoins were traded on BTC China in
November [2013], the platform with the highest trading volume in the
world, according to statistics gathered by bitcoincharts.com, which
provides financial and technical data related to the Bitcoin network.”212
This compares with second-ranked Mt. Gox, which accounted for nearly
700,000 Bitcoins traded during November, 2013.213 On December 5,
2013, in a joint statement issued with four of China’s major regulatory
organizations (the China Banking Regulatory Commission, China
Securities Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission), the
People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, “barred financial
institutions from handling Bitcoin transactions after investors lost money

210

Sarah Bracking & Lloyd Sachikonye, Remittances, Poverty Reduction and
Informalisation in Zimbabwe 2005-6: A Political Economy of Dispossession? (Brooks
World Poverty Institute, Working Paper No. 28, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265516 (internal citations omitted).
211

John Coulter, Beware of the Baneful Bitcoin Bug, CHINA DAILY, (Nov. 29, 2013, 7:02
AM), available at http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/201311/29/content_17140806.htm.
212

Xinhua, China Becomes Largest Bitcoin Market, CHINA DAILY, (Dec. 5, 2013, 10:09
AM), available at http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201312/05/content_17153413.htm.
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on fraudulent online platforms for the virtual currency.”214 Reasoning
offered by the central bank was that “the virtual currency could be used
for reckless speculation, money laundering, drug and gun transactions,
gambling and other illegal activities. It could also be used by terrorists to
fund attacks.”215 China Daily reported that “[w]ithin one hour following
the warning, per Bitcoin price plunged by as much as 35 percent at BTC
China, the main Bitcoin trading platform in the country.”216 Moreover, the
regulatory agencies
[D]emanded financial and payment institutions not to price
their products or services with Bitcoins, or to engage in
transactions involving Bitcoins, or to accept insurances
related to Bitcoins. The notice also told Bitcoin-transaction
online platforms to register at China’s telecom industry
regulator in accordance with laws, and to carry out antilaundering obligations by identifying its consumers and
reporting suspicious transactions . . . After the release of
the notice, the price of one Bitcoin at BTC China dived
from 6,970 yuan ($1,137) to as low as just over 4,500 yuan
in about one hour, down by 35 percent.217
[74] Shortly thereafter, China’s central bank ordered third-party
payment companies “not to do business with Bitcoin exchanges in China,
meaning that holders of the virtual currency would lack a channel to
exchange their Bitcoins for such currencies as the Chinese yuan or US
214

Wu Yiyao & Gao Changxin, Banks Not Allowed to Use Bitcoin, CHINA DAILY, (Dec.
5, 2013, 11:31 PM), available at http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201312/05/content_17157648.htm.
215
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AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-12/06/content_17156199.htm.
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dollar.”218 “Alipay, the payment unit of Alibaba . . . confirmed to China
Daily . . . that it has not supported and will not support Bitcoin-based
transactions.”219 On January 8, 201 , Taobao, China’s “largest customerto-customer site, banned the transaction of virtual currency exchanges . . .
following a central bank notice.”220
J. Theoretical Foundation, Open-Source Communities &
Bitcoin
[75] The European Central Bank reports that the theoretical foundation
of Bitcoin “can be found in the Austrian school of economics and its
criticism of the current fiat money system and interventions undertaken by
governments and other agencies, which, in their view, result in
exacerbated business cycles and massive inflation.”221 According to the
European Central Bank
One of the topics upon which the Austrian School of
economics, led by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Ludwig von
Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek, has focused is business
cycles. In short, according to the Austrian theory, business
cycles are the inevitable consequence of monetary
interventions in the market, whereby an excessive
expansion of bank credit causes an increase in the supply of
money through the money creation process in a fractionalreserve banking system, which in turn leads to artificially
218

Wu Yiyao, Bitcoin Falls On 3rd-Party Pullback, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 18, 2013, 7:01
AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-12/18/content_17182528.htm.
219
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220

He Wei, Bitcoin Transactions Banned On Taobao, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 8, 2014, 3:45
PM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-01/08/content_17224285.htm. See
generally Derek E. Bambauer et al., Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country
Study (Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School Research
Publication No. 2005-10, Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=706681.
221

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 127, at 22.
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low interest rates. In this situation, the entrepreneurs,
guided by distorted interest rate signals, embark on overly
ambitious investment projects that do not match
consumers’ preferences at that time relating to
intertemporal consumption (i.e. their decisions regarding
near-term and future consumption). Sooner or later, this
widespread imbalance can no longer be sustained and leads
to a recession, during which firms need to liquidate any
failed investment projects and readapt (restructure) their
production structures in line with consumers’ intertemporal
preferences. As a result, many Austrian School economists
call for this process to be abandoned by abolishing the
fractional-reserve banking system and returning to money
based on the gold standard, which cannot be easily
manipulated by any authority.
Another related area in which Austrian economists have
been very active is monetary theory. One of the foremost
names in this field is Friedrich A. Hayek. He wrote some
very influential publications, such as Denationalisation of
Money (1976), in which he posits that governments should
not have a monopoly over the issuance of money. He
instead suggests that private banks should be allowed to
issue non-interest-bearing certificates based on their own
registered trademarks. These certificates (i.e. currencies)
should be open to competition and would be traded at
variable exchange rates. Any currencies able to guarantee a
stable purchasing power would eliminate other less stable
currencies from the market. The result of this process of
competition and profit maximisation would be a highly
efficient monetary system where only stable currencies
would coexist.
The following ideas are generally shared by Bitcoin and its
supporters:
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— They see Bitcoin as a good starting point to end
the monopoly central banks have in the issuance of
money.
— They strongly criticize the current fractionalreserve banking system whereby banks can extend
their credit supply above their actual reserves and,
simultaneously, depositors can withdraw their funds
in their current accounts at any time.
— The scheme is inspired by the former gold
standard.
Although the theoretical roots of the scheme can be found
in the Austrian School of economics, Bitcoin has raised
serious concerns among some of today’s Austrian
economists. Their criticism covers two general aspects: a)
Bitcoins have no intrinsic value like gold; they are mere
bits stored in a computer; and b) the system fails to satisfy
the “Misean Regression Theorem,” which explains that
money becomes accepted not because of a government
decree or social convention, but because it has its roots in a
commodity expressing a certain purchasing power.222
[76] While Hayek “argued that traditional government-backed
currencies are prone to a number of weaknesses, particularly susceptibility
to inflation and political corruption [p]rivate currencies…. are more stable
than traditional currencies because they do not share these weaknesses.”223
François Velde believes that Hayek is misguided in his thesis that the
production of money should be the domain of the private sector and not
remain a monopoly of the state. Velde believes that Bitcoin is far from
222

Id. at 22-23; see also Nicholas Cachanosky & Alexander William Salter, The View
from Vienna: An Analysis of the Renewed Interest in the Mises-Hayek Theory of the
Business Cycle (Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363560.
223
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what Hayek imagined, in that Bitcoin fails to be disciplined by market
forces to maintain stability of its value.224 Accordingly, “[t]he Bitcoin
network is an automaton, issuing currency at a predictable rate, perfectly
incapable of providing ‘good money’ in Hayek’s sense, i.e., a currency of
stable value.”225 In addition, by virtue of its first-mover advantage,
Bitcoin has laid claim to quasi-monopoly status, “and Hayek did not
address whether currency is a natural monopoly.”226 Accordingly, as
Luther observes, Bitcoin use benefits from the fact that “[s]uccessive
rounds of quantitative easing in the United States have been met with
opposition, as some users of the dollar fear the currency will be worth
significantly less in the future. Similarly, instability in Europe prompts
fears of the devaluation or outright collapse of the euro.”227
[77] Bitcoin appears to have its basis as an open-source community.
According to Teigland, Yetis and Larsson
Over the past two decades, the wide adoption of the
Internet and developments in information and
communication technologies (ICT) have greatly boosted
the development of online knowledge creation
communities, with some of these collective and emergent
environments now disrupting and transforming industries.
For example, open source software (OSS) communities
(e.g., LINUX, MySQL) demonstrate how a globally
dispersed group of strangers self-organize online to
challenge and disrupt the software industry’s established
norms for innovation and value creation. Money as a social
224

François R. Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, 317 CHI. FED. LETTER 3-4 (2013), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2013/cfldecem
ber2013_317.pdf.
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institution has also been affected by the developments in
Internet and ICT and has evolved to adapt to the online
economy. In recent years, we have seen the rapid spread of
online banking, new payment services such as PayPal and
mobile payments, and even new virtual currencies such as
Linden Dollars and Project Entropia Dollars. These virtual
currencies are used by virtual communities to exchange
goods and services within the community and even with
others outside the community, thereby providing a medium
of exchange and a unit of account for that particular virtual
community (ECB, 2012) . . . .228 Open source communities
emerge when strangers from across the globe come
together online to self-organize around a shared interest and
to create value through sharing knowledge and innovating.
Some scholars propose that these communities are
challenging the firm-based approach to knowledge creation
as the primary mechanism for innovation.229
K. Governance
[78] Kroll, Davey and Felten argue that “Bitcoin will re uire the
emergence of governance structures, contrary to the commonly held view
in the Bitcoin community that the currency is ungovernable.”230 Teigland,
Yetis and Larsson describe the Bitcoin community’s formal governance as
follows:
The Bitcoin Foundation was founded by seven of the
community’s most instrumental individuals, such as Gavin
Andresen – a core Bitcoin developer. The Bitcoin
Foundation has been registered under section 501c of the
228

Teigland, supra note 129 at 3.
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US Internal Revenue Code in Washington, D.C., and its
bylaws were effective as of July 23, 2012. The Foundation
is governed by a board with five seats split by membership
class. Two seats elected by the Individual member class
(annual membership costs .23 BTC), two seats by the
Corporate member class (five different levels from 9.4
BTC for companies younger than two years and with less
than 25 employees to 935.4 BTC for Platinum companies),
and one seat by the Founding member class. The
Individual member class currently has 426 members (of
which 68 are anonymous) while the Corporate member
class comprises two platinum and eight silver members.
The Board has established the following requirements for
its board members: 1) an Individual member in good
standing, 2) any business is conducted openly using their
real identity, and 3) they pass a background check for
felony conviction.231
[79] As would be expected in such a diverse community as that
associated with the technologically complex mining of Bitcoin, Kroll,
Davey and Felten depict a number of pressing issues that require
governance structure including: threats from actual adversaries; the need
for a change in the minimum transaction size; protocol instabilities; and
the resolution of inevitable software bugs and accidents such as the
conflict between version 0.7 and 0.8 during March 2013.232 Moreover
We argue that such governance is already emerging, that it
will take the form of the governance of an open source
project (in the sense that leaders cannot take actions
231

Teigland, supra note 129, at 10 (citing Bylaws of the Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.,
GITHUB, https://github.com/pmlaw/The-Bitcoin-Foundation-LegalRepo/blob/master/Bylaws/Bylaws_of_The_Bitcoin_Foundation.md (last visited May 13,
2014); Governance Structure, BITCOIN FOUNDATION,
https://bitcoinfoundation.org/about/governance (last visited May 13, 2014)).
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contrary to the interests and will of the community without
naturally losing legitimacy), and that the emergence of
formal governance structures will ultimately subject
Bitcoin itself (and not merely particular players) to
influence by government regulators around the world.233
L. Ecosystem
[80] Bitcoin enjoys a growing ecosystem “including exchanges,
transaction services providers, market information and chart providers,
escrow providers, joint mining operations and so on. Absent from this
ecosystem at present are futures markets and entities offering legitimate
investment returns, such as fractional reserve banks, although some
individuals have announced plans to build these.”234 Reuben Grinberg
observes
Individuals holding this currency represent a number of
interests, including technology early adopters, privacy and
cryptography enthusiasts, government-mistrusting “gold
bugs,” criminals, and speculators. A large number of
online merchants accept bitcoins, catering to individuals
with these interests, including web hosts, online casinos,
illicit drug marketplaces, auction sites, technology
consulting firms, and adult media and sex toy merchants.235
233
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[81] Considerable press and commercial interest grows in Bitcoin as its
use increases. Teigland, Yetis and Larsson report that “[o]ne area of
interest is the range of start-ups entering the Bitcoin ecosystem. For
example, BitPay, an electronic payment processing system for the Bitcoin
currency, enables merchants to accept bitcoins as a form of payment.”236
San Francisco-based Coinbase was founded in June of 2012 as “a Bitcoin
wallet and platform where merchants and consumers can transact.”237
During late 2013, Coinbase received a vote of confidence and $25 million
investment infusion, led by venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz,
which was subsequently doubled at the failure of Mt. Gox.238
Accordingly, Coinbase lists its current metrics as “1,100,000 consumer
wallets, 29,000 merchants, 5,000 API applications, and U.S. bank
integration.”239 New entrants appear almost daily in the Bitcoin
ecosystem. As would be expected, Bitcoin seems to have inspired several
other cryptocurrencies such as iOwe, which is “based on promises for

http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4465.0; Ryepdx, What if One Bitcoin Was Worth
the Same as One Share Berkshire Hathaway?, BITCOIN FORUM (Mar. 12, 2011, 02:00
AM), http://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4390.0 (discussing whether a single Bitcoin
would ever equal in worth a share of Berkshire Hathaway); Trade, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Trade (last modified Apr. 14, 2014) (identifying merchants that
accept bitcoins)).
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future work.”240
Coinmarketcap.com lists one hundred different
cryptocurrencies as of mid-May 2014, having a total market capitalization
of approximately $6.178 US billion.241
The top ten of these
cryptocurrencies ranked by market capitalization as of May 13, 2014 are:
Bitcoin ($6.604 billion), Litecoin ($294 million), Ripple ($47 million);
Peercoin ($44.6 million); Dogecoin ($34.9 million), Nxt ($30 million);
Namecoin ($17.7 million); Mastercoin ($16.7 million); Darkcoin ($11.2
million); and Blackcoin ($8.4 million).242 For example, Litecoin describes
itself as “a peer-to-peer Internet currency that enables instant payments to
anyone in the world. [Litecoin] is based on the Bitcoin protocol but
differs from Bitcoin in that it can be efficiently mined with consumergrade hardware.”243
[82] Peercoin boasts that “[t]hrough an innovative minting algorithm,
the Peercoin network consumes far less energy, maintains stronger
security, and rewards users in more sustainable ways than other
cryptocurrencies.”244 Other Bitcoin-related or inspired projects of note
include: the Bitcoin Investment Trust, Gyft, BitPremier, Coinsetter, itBit,
Ripple Labs, CommitCoin, Mave and MavePay, Korbit and BitPagos;245
240
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and the effort by Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss to launch a Bitcoin
exchange-traded fund (ETF).246 Gambling sites are reported, such as
Satoshi Dice, “which allow punters to gamble in a weird, automated
fashion.”247 Jared Ho reports that during early 201 “Overstock.com
announced that it would begin accepting bitcoins as payment for consumer
purchases. The company’s announcement makes Overstock.com the first
major US online retailer to accept bitcoins, albeit via a third-party
payment processor.”248 Bitcoin ATM machines are available in Canada,
London,249 Seattle, Washington and Austin, Texas as of early 2014.250

Verifications (2012), available at http://bitslog.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/mave1.pdf ;
Written Testimony of Barry E. Silbert,Founder & CEO, Second Market & Founder,
Bitcoin Investment Trust, to the New York State Department of Financial Services,
Hearings on the Regulation of Virtual Currencies (Jan. 28, 2014) (available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/silbert.pdf).
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Bitcoin Trust, Registration Statement (Form S-1, Amend. 1) (Oct. 8, 2013), available at
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M. A Threat to International Currency Stability?
[83] To examine how Bitcoin might pose a threat to international
currency stability, let us briefly examine the role of the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”). Rebuilding international economies proved to
be a major task at the end of World War II. As a specialized agency of the
United Nations, the IMF is charged with tasks of (1) overseeing the
international monetary system to ensure exchange rate stability, and (2) to
encourage members to eliminate exchange restrictions that discourage free
trade.251 Nicholas Plassaras observes that the IMF “is the international
institution tasked with coordinating the international foreign currency
exchange. It sets minimum standards for what member nations can do to
their individual currencies, in order to preserve global economic
stability.”252 Plassaras poses the following threat scenario
Because Bitcoin is not formally backed by a country’s
government, it is not bound by the IMF’s guidelines. As a
result, Bitcoin poses a serious threat to the economic
stability of the foreign currency exchange if it continues to
grow in both value and usage. Any other digital currency
that entered widespread use would pose similar problems.
Because private digital currencies like Bitcoin fall outside
the IMF’s legal framework, the IMF is unable to obtain
those currencies directly. As a result, the IMF is limited in
what it can do to intervene in the event that a private digital
currency like Bitcoin is used to attack the value of a
conventional currency through what is known as a
“speculative attack.” A speculative attack occurs when an
investor wishes to take advantage of a “weak currency,” a
251

See About the IMF: History: Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944-71),
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currency that has depreciated in value relative to other
currencies. If left unchecked, a successful attack can push
a weak currency’s value even lower, resulting in a
destabilization of the international foreign currency
exchange. If Bitcoin becomes an important currency in
international commerce, its use in speculative attacks could
cause serious economic harms unless the IMF develops a
way to counter them.253
[84] Plassaras contends that the problem may, with time,
become an ever greater threat to world order, in that
[T]he longer the IMF takes to bring Bitcoin within its
control, the more difficult controlling Bitcoin will become.
Bitcoins are generated through computer software which is
programmed to halt the production of new Bitcoins by
approximately 2025. Once Bitcoins can no longer be
generated, their supply becomes finite and their value can
be expected to increase. As their value increases, so does
the expense that the IMF has to incur in order to obtain
them. Because having a supply of Bitcoins is necessary to
effectively counter a speculative attack, the sooner the IMF
can acquire a supply of Bitcoins, the cheaper counteracting
such an attack will be.254
V. LIBERTY RESERVE
[85] On May 20, 2013, a sealed indictment was returned by a grand jury
in the Southern District of New York charging Defendants Liberty
Reserve S.A., Arthur Budovsky, Vladimir Kats, Ahmed Yassine
Abdelghani, Allan Esteban Hidalgo Jimenez, Azzeddine El Amine, Mark
253
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Marmilev, and Maxim Chukharev with (1) conspiracy to commit money
laundering,255 conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting
business,256 and operation of an unlicensed money transmitting
business.257 The Indictment seeks the forfeiture of property involved in
the money laundering conspiracy or the unlicensed money transmitting
business offenses consisting of: funds held in 45 accounts located in
Australia, Costa Rica, China, Cypress, Hong Kong, Latvia, Morocco,
Russia, Spain, and the United States, and Internet domain names:
Libertyreserve.com,
Exchangezone.com,
Swiftexchanger.com,
Moneycentralmarket.com, Asianagold.com, and Eurogoldcash.com.258
A. E-Gold (2006)
[86] The founding of Liberty Reserve allegedly dates back to
defendants Budovsky and Kats’ prior failed attempt at running Gold Age,
Inc., a third-party digital exchange service called “e-Gold,” reportedly the
most popular digital currency operation at the time.259 Assistant Attorney
General Raman reports that establishing an account only required a valid
e-mail address, thus providing international transactions that were highly
anonymous.260 Accordingly, “e-Gold became a popular payment method
for sellers of child pornography, operators of investment scams, and
perpetrators of credit card and identity fraud. At its peak, e-Gold
reportedly moved over $6 million each day for more than 2.5 million
255
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May 20, 2013) (available at https://archive.org/stream/704540-liberty-reserveindictment/704540-liberty-reserve-indictment_djvu.txt).
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accounts. In 2008, e-Gold and the three individuals pleaded guilty.”261
The complaint reports that “in December 2006, Budosvky and Kats were
convicted in New York State of operating ‘Gold Age, Inc.’ as an
unlicensed money transmitting business. At or about the same time, EGold [sic] and several of its principals were charged with various offenses
including money laundering.”262 The complaint further alleges that
following his criminal conviction, defendant Arthur Budovsky “set about
building a digital currency that would succeed in eluding law enforcement
where E-Gold had failed, by, among other ways, locating the business
outside the United States. Accordingly, Budovsky immigrated to Costa
Rica, where in 2006, he and Ahmed Yassine Abdelghani, . . . the
defendant, had incorporated Liberty Reserve.”263
B. How Liberty Reserve Works
[87]

The indictment reveals that
[T]o use Liberty reserve’s digital currency, commonly
referred to as ‘LR,’ a user first was re uired to open an
account through the Liberty Reserve website.
In
registering, the user was required to provide basic
identifying information, such as name, address, and date of
birth. However, unlike traditional banks or legitimate
online payments processors, Liberty Reserve did not
require users to validate their identity information, such as
by providing official identification documents or a credit
card. Accounts could therefore be opened easily using
fictitious or anonymous identities.

261
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Once a user established an account with Liberty reserve,
the user could then conduct transactions with other Liberty
Reserve users. That is, the user could receive transfers of
‘LR’ from other user’s accounts, and transfer LR from his
own account to other users – including any ‘merchants’ that
accepted LR as payment. Liberty reserve charged a onepercent fee every time a user transferred LR to another user
through the Liberty Reserve system. In addition, for an
additional ‘privacy fee’ of 7 cents per transaction, a user
could hide his own Liberty Reserve account number when
transferring funds, effectively making the transfer
completely untraceable, even within Liberty reserve’s
already opaque system.
To add an additional layer of anonymity, Liberty Reserve
did not permit users to fund their accounts by transferring
money to Liberty Reserve directly, such as by issuing a
credit card payment or wire transfer to Liberty Reserve.
Nor could Liberty Reserve users withdraw funds from their
accounts directly, such as through an ATM withdrawal.
Instead, Liberty Reserve users were required to make any
deposits or withdrawals through the use of third-party
‘exchangers,’ thus enabling Liberty Reserve to avoiding
collecting any information about its users through banking
transactions or other activity that would leave a centralized
financial paper trail.
Liberty Reserve’s ‘exchangers’ were third-party entities
that maintained direct financial relationships with Liberty
Reserve, buying and selling LR in bulk from Liberty
Reserve in exchange for mainstream currency. The
exchangers in turn bought and sold this LR in smaller
transactions with end users in exchange for mainstream
currency. Thus, in order to fund a Liberty Reserve account,
a user was required to transmit mainstream currency in
some fashion (through a money remitter, for example) to an
88
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exchanger. Upon receiving the user’s payment, the
exchanger credited the user’s Liberty Reserve account with
a corresponding amount of LR, by transferring LR from the
exchanger’s Liberty Reserve account to the user’s account.
Similarly, if a Liberty Reserve user wished to withdraw
funds from his account, the user was required to transfer
LR from his account, and the exchanger then made
arrangements to provide the user a corresponding amount
of mainstream currency.
The Liberty Reserve website recommended a number of
‘pre-approved’ exchangers. These exchangers tended to be
unlicensed money transmitting businesses operating
without significant governmental oversight or regulation,
concentrated in Malaysia, Russia, Nigeria, and Vietnam.
The exchangers charged transaction fees for their services,
typically amounting to five percent or more of the funds
being exchanged. Such fees were much higher than those
charged by mainstream banks or payment processors for
comparable money transfers.264
C. Criminal Activity
[88]

The indictment contends that
Liberty Reserve’s system was designed so that criminals
could affect financial transactions under multiple layers of
anonymity and thereby avoid apprehension by law
enforcement. Not surprisingly, Liberty Reserve was in fact
used extensively for illegal purposes, functioning in effect
as the bank of choice for the criminal underworld. Liberty
Reserve users routinely established accounts under false
names – including such blatantly criminal monikers as
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‘Russia Hackers’ and ‘Hacker Account.’
Believing
themselves to be protected by this anonymity, Liberty
Reserve users then engaged in criminal transactions with an
impunity that would have been impossible in the legitimate
financial system.
To further enable the use of Liberty reserve for criminal
activity, its website offered a ‘shopping cart interface’ that
‘merchant’ websites could use to accept LR currency as a
form of payment. The ‘merchants’ who accepted LR
currency were overwhelmingly criminal in nature. They
included, for example: traffickers of stolen credit card data
and personal identity information; peddlers of various types
of online Ponzi and get-rich-quick schemes; computer
hackers for hire; unregulated gambling enterprises; and
underground drug-dealing websites.
In addition to being used to process payments for illegal
goods and services online, Liberty Reserve was also used
by cyber-criminal associates. Liberty Reserve was used by
credit-card theft and computer-hacking rings operating in
countries around the world, including Vietnam, Nigeria,
Hong Kong, China, and the United States, to distribute
proceeds of these conspiracies among the members
involved.265
[89] Jennifer Shasky Calvery, FinCEN Director, states “Liberty
Reserve operated as an online… money transfer system . . . deliberately
designed to avoid regulatory scrutiny and tailored its services to illicit
actors looking to launder their ill-gotten gains . . . [a] $6 billion money
laundering operation.”266 Acting Assistant U.S. Attorney General Raman
265
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contends that the Liberty Reserve case demonstrates the DOJ’s
determination “to pursue purported major money laundering facilitators,
even those who hide offshore.”267 Because of the action taken by the
DOJ, Raman states that “the site was shuttered and effectively put out of
business, and seven defendants were charged. One is in custody in the
United States, one has entered a guilty plea, three others, including the
lead defendant Budovsky, are pending extradition,” and two others are at
large.268
VI. SILK ROAD
[90] Between January 2011 and arrest of its entrepreneur during
October, 2013, Silk Road operated as an intermediary, much like eBay or
CraigsList, by providing buyers and sellers with a transaction
infrastructure platform. However, unlike eBay or CraigsList, Silk Road is
dedicated to providing a high level of anonymity between buyers, sellers
and third parties who might desire to learn the details of these transactions.
Silk Road is just one of several anonymous networks that have recently
become possible with the advent of relatively easy-to-use browser
interfaces, such as the “Tor browser bundle.”269
A. How Silk Road Works
[91] In their letter addressed to Attorney General Eric Holder and the
DEA, U.S. Senators Manchin and Schumer write that
267
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By utilizing the anonymizing network TOR, Silk Road
ensures that users’ tracks on the site are hidden. The only
method of payment for these illegal purchases is an
untraceable peer-to-peer currency known as Bitcoins. After
purchasing Bitcoins through an exchange, a user can create
an account on Silk Road and start purchasing illegal drugs
from individuals around the world and have them delivered
to their homes within days.270
[92] Sites dealing primarily in illicit goods and services such as Black
Market Reloaded and The Silk Road “use Bitcoins because they can be
exchanged and accumulated like cash without any third party recording
[these] transactions . . . unlike PayPal or other ways of sending money
online, [Bitcoins] are untraceable since they do not require a particular
identity to be attached to them.”271 Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir report that
“Silk Road also used a so-called “tumbler” which, as the site explained,
‘sent all payments through a complex, semi-random series of dummy
transactions making it nearly impossible to link your payment with any
coins leaving the site.”’272
[93] The indictment announced on February 4, 2014 in Manhattan
federal court of Ross William Ulbricht, a/k/a “Dread Pirate Roberts,” a/k/a
“Silk Road”, states that
270
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ULBRICHT sought to anonymize transactions on Silk
Road in two principal ways. First, ULBRICHT operated
Silk Road on what is known as “The Onion Router,” or
“Tor” network, a special network of computers on the
Internet, distributed around the world, designed to conceal
the true IP addresses of the computers on the network and
thereby the identities of the networks’ users. Second,
ULBRICHT designed Silk Road to include a Bitcoin-based
payment system that served to facilitate the illegal
commerce conducted on the site, including by concealing
the identities and locations of the users transmitting and
receiving funds through the site.273
B. Criminal Activity
[94] Nicholas Christin reports that “these anonymous online markets
very often specialize in ‘black market’ goods, such as pornography,
weapons or narcotics.”274 U.S. Senator Joe Manchin urged during June
2011 that the Drug Enforcement Agency and U.S. Attorney General
“immediately shut down an anonymous online black market for drugs,
including prescription drugs, cocaine, LSD and heroin.”275 Making
specific reference to Silk Road, the Senator’s press release observes that
“[t]he illicit network . . . allows users anywhere in the country to purchase
illicit drugs using untraceable currency and have them shipped to their
273
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homes via the United States Postal Service.”276 The October 25, 2013
complaint and civil forfeiture action filed in Manhattan federal court
allege that Ross William Ulbricht had owned and operated, since about
January 2011, an “underground website known as Silk Road, which
emerged as the most sophisticated and extensive criminal marketplace on
the internet.”277 This complaint further alleges that Silk Road “served as a
sprawling black-market bazaar where unlawful goods and services,
including illegal drugs of virtually every variety, were bought and sold
regularly by the site’s users . . . [and] was used by several thousand drug
dealers and other unlawful vendors to distribute hundreds of kilograms of
illegal drugs” during its approximately 2 ½-year operating life.278 The
Manhattan U.S. Attorney described Silk Road as “a hidden website
designed to enable its users to buy and sell illegal drugs and other
unlawful goods and services anonymously and beyond the reach of law
enforcement.”279 Moreover,
In addition to the civil action, a criminal complaint against
ULBRICHT was filed in Manhattan federal court charging
him with one count of narcotics conspiracy, one count of
conspiracy to commit computer hacking, and one count of
money laundering conspiracy. ULBRICHT was arrested in
San Francisco, California, on October 1, 2013 . . . .
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ULBRICHT has also been charged in a separate indictment
pending in federal court in Baltimore, Maryland.280
[95] According to the February 4, 2014 indictment and other
information and documents previously filed in Manhattan federal court:
ULBRICHT deliberately operated Silk Road as an online
criminal marketplace intended to enable its users to buy
and sell drugs and other illegal goods and services
anonymously and outside the reach of law enforcement . . .
The vast majority of items for sale on Silk Road were
illegal drugs, which were openly advertised as such on the
site. As of September 23, 2013, Silk Road had nearly
13,000 listings for controlled substances, listed under such
categories as “Cannabis,” “Dissociatives,” “Ecstasy,”
“Intoxicants,” “Opioids,” “Precursors,” “Prescription,”
“Psychedelics,” and “Stimulants.” From November 2011
to September 2013, law enforcement agents made more
than 100 individual undercover purchases of controlled
substances from Silk Road vendors. These purchases
included heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, and LSD, among other
illegal drugs, and were filled by vendors believed to be
located in more than ten different countries, including the
United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, the
United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Austria and France.
In addition to illegal narcotics, other illicit goods and
services were openly bought and sold on Silk Road as well.
For example, as of September 23, 2013, there were: 159
listings under the category “Services,” most of which
offered computer-hacking services, such as a listing by a
vendor offering to hack into social networking accounts of
280

Id.

95

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 4

the customer’s choosing; 801 listings under the category
“Digital goods,” including malicious software, hacked
accounts at various online services, and pirated media
content; and 169 listings under the category “Forgeries,”
including offers to produce fake driver’s licenses,
passports, Social Security cards, utility bills, credit card
statements, car insurance records, and other forms of false
identification documents.
Using the online moniker “Dread Pirate Roberts,” or
“DPR,” ULBRICHT controlled and oversaw every aspect
of Silk Road, and managed a small staff of paid, online
administrators who assisted with the day-to-day operation
of the site. Through his ownership and operation of Silk
Road, ULBRICHT reaped commissions worth tens of
millions of dollars generated from the illicit sales
conducted through the site. ULBRICHT also demonstrated
a willingness to use violence to protect his criminal
enterprise and the anonymity of its users. ULBRICHT even
solicited six murders-for-hire in connection with operating
the site, although there is no evidence these murders were
actually carried out.281
C. Use of Bitcoin
[96] The FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York announced on October 2 , 2013 that “[a]long with a prior
seizure of approximately 29,655 Bitcoins, federal law enforcement agents
have now seized a total of approximately 173,991 Bitcoins in connection
with the Silk Road case . . . worth over $33.6 million.”282 Just a few
weeks later, as of November 15, 2013, the value of these 173,991 Bitcoins
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doubled to more than $70 million.283 This seizure arises as a result of “a
civil action previously filed . . . on September 30, 2013, seeking the
forfeiture of all assets of Silk Road, including its website and all of its
Bitcoins because those assets allegedly were used to facilitate money
laundering and constitute property involved in money laundering.”284
[97] On January 16, 2014, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York announced the forfeiture of approximately 29,655 Bitcoins
(worth approximately $28 million) and the forfeiture of the Silk Road
hidden website.285 Just ten days later, the unsealing of charges were
announced “against ROBERT M. FAIELLA, a/k/a/ ‘BTCKing,’ an
underground Bitcoin exchanger, and CHARLIE SHREM, the Chief
Executive Officer and Compliance Officer of a Bitcoin exchange
company, for engaging in a scheme to sell over $1 million in Bitcoins to
users of ‘Silk Road.’”286 Allegations in the Criminal Complaint revealed:
From about December 2011 to October 2013, FAIELLA
ran an underground Bitcoin exchange on the Silk Road
website, a website that served as a sprawling and
anonymous black market bazaar where illegal drugs of
virtually every variety were bought and sold regularly by
the site’s users. Operating under the username “BTCKing,”
FAIELLA sold Bitcoins
the only form of payment
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accepted on Silk Road
to users seeking to buy illegal
drugs on the site. Upon receiving orders for Bitcoins from
Silk Road users, he filled the orders through a company
based in New York, New York (the “Company”). The
Company was designed to enable customers to exchange
cash for Bitcoins anonymously, that is, without providing
any personal identifying information, and it charged a fee
for its service. FAIELLA obtained Bitcoins with the
Company’s assistance, and then sold the Bitcoins to Silk
Road users at a markup.
SHREM is the Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
and from about August 2011 until about July 2013, when
the Company ceased operating, he was also its Compliance
Officer, in charge of ensuring the Company’s compliance
with federal and other anti-money laundering (“AML”)
laws. SHREM is also the Vice Chairman of a foundation
dedicated to promoting the Bitcoin virtual currency system.
SHREM, who personally bought drugs on Silk Road, was
fully aware that Silk Road was a drug-trafficking website,
and through his communications with FAIELLA, SHREM
also knew that FAIELLA was operating a Bitcoin exchange
service for Silk Road users. Nevertheless, SHREM
knowingly facilitated FAIELLA’s business with the
Company in order to maintain FAIELLA’s business as a
lucrative source of Company revenue. SHREM knowingly
allowed FAIELLA to use the Company’s services to buy
Bitcoins for his Silk Road customers; personally processed
FAIELLA’s orders; gave FAIELLA discounts on his highvolume transactions; failed to file a single suspicious
activity report with the United States Treasury Department
about FAIELLA’s illicit activity, as he was otherwise
re uired to do in his role as the Company’s Compliance
Officer; and deliberately helped FAIELLA circumvent the
Company’s AML restrictions, even though it was
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SHREM’s job to enforce them and even though the
Company had registered with the Treasury Department as a
money services business.
Working together, SHREM and FAIELLA exchanged over
$1 million in cash for Bitcoins for the benefit of Silk Road
users, so that the users could, in turn, make illegal
purchases on Silk Road.
In late 2012, when the Company stopped accepting cash
payments, FAIELLA ceased doing business with the
Company and temporarily shut down his illegal Bitcoin
exchange service on Silk Road. FAIELLA resumed
operating on Silk Road in April 2013 without the
Company’s assistance, and continued to exchange tens of
thousands of dollars a week in Bitcoins until the Silk Road
website was shut down by law enforcement in October
2013.287
[98] From analysis performed on available Bitcoin data compared with
FBI disclosures, Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir contend that the FBI has yet to
recover all the Bitcoins earned by the Dread Pirate Roberts (Ross William
Ulbricht):
[T]here is a huge variability in the amount he earned which
we are aware of, which is inconsistent with the reasonable
assumption that the total volume of business carried out on
Silk Road was increasing at a roughly constant rate. In
particular, the months of May, June and September 2013
are completely missing from this list. Assuming that DPR
continued to receive at least some commissions from Silk
Road during these months, it seems likely that he was
simply using a different computer during these periods,
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which the FBI had not found or was unable to penetrate. In
addition, it is evident that about a third of the bitcoins in
these accounts, were moved out prior to his arrest. As it is
believed that the Silk Road marketplace generated sales
revenue of more than 9.5 million bitcoins with an average
commission rate of 6.67%, we can conclude that he
received about 633,000 BTCs in commissions.
Consequently, the amounts seized by the FBI represent
only about 22% of these commissions, while the amounts
that we have identified . . . seem to represent about a
third.288
VII. DEMISE OF MT. GOX
[99] Mt. Gox, once the dominant online marketplace for the purchase
and sale of Bitcoin, apparently failed on February 25, 2014, leaving many
investors who held Bitcoin stranded.289 The Mt. Gox website was replaced
with a letter addressed to its customers from Mark Karpeles which read: “I
would like to use this opportunity to reassure everyone that I am still in
Japan, and working very hard with the support of different parties to find a
solution to our recent issues.”290 A companion note under the signature of
the “MtGox Team” states, “In light of recent news reports and the
potential repercussions on MtGox’s operations and the market, a decision
was taken to close all transactions for the time being in order to protect the
site and our users. We will be closely monitoring the situation and will
288
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react accordingly.”291 During 2009, Mt. Gox began operations “as an
exchange for trading cards tied to a popular online game called Magic:
The Gathering. It soon shifted its focus to Bitcoin . . . .” 292 Although
perhaps too early to know the complete reasons for Mt. Gox’s failure,
press accounts mention “accusations that as much as 6 percent of the
Bitcoins in circulation were now missing worth more than $300 million
at current exchange rates.”293 Another news source states that “Mt. Gox
lost almost 7 0,000 bitcoins in a long running theft . . . valued at about
$ 00 million at current prices.”294 In an astonishing price recovery,
Tuesday evening [Feb. 24, 2014] the price of a Bitcoin stood around $525,
not far from where it was when the Mt. Gox news emerged Monday
night.295 Less than a year earlier, Tokyo-based Mt. Gox was reported to
handle 80% of all trading activity in Bitcoin and is reported to have said
that “as the bitcoin market continues to evolve and expand, [Mt. Gox]
must adjust to new regulatory and compliance demands.”296
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VIII. BITCOIN AFTER LIBERTY RESERVE AND SILK ROAD
[100] Concerns that have been voiced during recent years have reached
new prominence since the Liberty Reserve indictment. Reuben Grinberg
observes that “although the Bitcoin economy is flourishing, users are
anxious about Bitcoin’s legal status and the possibility of a government
crackdown. Some point to Bitcoin’s ability, like all digital and
anonymous currencies, to facilitate money laundering, tax evasion, and
trade in illegal drugs and child pornography.”297 Catherine Martin
Christopher contends that “law enforcement should look to digital
currency exchangers not as criminals, but instead as partners in the effort
to eradicate money laundering and
more importantly
the crimes
underlying the laundering.”298
[101] In discussing the “perplexities” of virtual currencies, FinCEN
Director, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, notes the importance, “potential,” and
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great “promise” of advances offered to our economy by virtual
currencies.299 Director Calvery states
The innovations we are seeing within the financial services
industry are a benefit to commerce on many levels. From
providing services to the unbanked, to the development of
new financial products, the virtual economy holds great
promise . . . [the] challenge to our great innovators [will be
to] extend your focus to devising creative solutions for
preventing the abuse of virtual currencies by criminals,
such as those who would exploit children.300
[102] Our discussion of the future of virtual currencies should consider
the views of François Velde who states
I’m not uite sure why there is so much attention paid to
the use of Bitcoin to settle legal transactions
cash has
been used for those purposes forever. If anything, a virtual
currency like Bitcoin provides traceability
if you have
access to a criminal’s hard drive, and therefore to his wallet
information, you could prove in court that certain payments
were made.301
A. Future Regulatory Dialogue: Legal Interoperability
[103] The debate regarding open access and internet governance has
been ongoing for many years.302 Jonathan Zittrain observes that
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Cyberlaw’s challenge ought to be to find ways of regulating
though not necessarily through direct state action which code can
and cannot be readily disseminated and run upon the generative
grid of Internet and PCs, lest consumer sentiment and preexisting
regulatory pressures prematurely and tragically terminate the grand
experiment that is the Internet today.303
[104] Urs Gasser and John G. Palfrey have broadly defined the term
legal interoperability as “the working-together among legal norms, either
within a given legal system of a nation state (e.g. federal and state
legislation) or across jurisdictions or nations.”304 Their core belief is
found in the argument “that policy-makers in the digital age should not
only aim for higher levels of technical and related layers of
interoperability, but should by default also seek to increase legal and,
eventually, policy interoperability, particularly as we move towards multilevel governance systems.”305 Thus, I will extend their argument to
929-930 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet
Architecture and the Law (U. San Diego Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 55,
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Field of Internet Governance, Yale Information Society Project Working Paper Series
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contend that by optimizing the international governance of virtual
currency, this legal interoperability should “enable the flow of goods,
services, and information across legal systems.”306 Gasser and Palfrey
offer at least three reasons why focusing on attaining legal interoperability
should prove beneficial
1. Legal interoperability is a mechanism that reduces the
costs associated with cross-jurisdictional business
transactions;
2. Anecdotal evidence suggests that legal interoperability,
at least in the ICT [information and communication
technology] space with its unique characteristics, drives
innovation, competition, trade, and economic growth;
3. “[I]ncreased levels of best-practice-oriented legal
interoperability may also foster fundamental values and
rights, such as information privacy and freedom of
expression."307
[105] Gasser and Palfrey are quick to point out that their concept of legal
interoperability does not necessarily re uire “new international law or the
establishment of international organizations. Which approach should be
pursued in the context of a given governance issue
like . . . cloud
computing . . . depends on an in-depth analysis of the various
306
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technological, market, and legal factors . . . .”308 Grinberg predicts that
U.S. federal and state regulations will need to clarify how Bitcoin fits
regarding: “registration with state or federal regulators; know your
customer (KYC), anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist
financing; capital requirements; consumer protection standards; disclosure
requirements; security standards; entering into derivatives on
cryptocurrencies; taxation; and risk management and counterparty due
diligence standards.”309 Zittrain writes
Precisely because the future is uncertain, those who care
about openness and the innovation that today’s Internet and
PC facilitate should not sacrifice the good to the perfect
or the future to the present by seeking simply to maintain
a tenuous technological status quo in the face of inexorable
pressure to change. Rather, we should establish the
principles that will blunt the most unappealing features of a
more
locked-down
technological
future
while
acknowledging that unprecedented and, too many who
work with information technology, genuinely unthinkable
boundaries could likely become the rules from which we
must negotiate exceptions.310
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B. Implications for Further Research
[106] The list of important research questions remaining to be more fully
explored include: whether virtual currency is easier to steal than physical
currency, how vulnerable are virtual currencies to counterfeiting, does
Bitcoin maintain first-mover advantage or is it vulnerable to other virtual
currencies, will depository “bank-like” financial service entities develop to
accept deposits and make loans denominated in virtual currencies, are
Bitcoin exchanges vulnerable to breaches from cyber attack; under what
conditions are virtual currencies able to remain anonymous, is physical
currency really less efficient for illegal activities than Bitcoin, and whether
virtual currencies or Bitcoin alone becomes significant enough to threaten
the effectiveness of central bank monetary policy and global currency
markets?311 Ed Felten raises the questions of: when a miner who is
“controlling more than 33.3% of mining power but less than 50%, is there
still an equilibrium in which all miners are honest? . . . [and] is [there] an
equilibrium that can actually occur in which the Bitcoin economy can no
longer function?”312
[107] Economist Robert J. Shiller states that “Bitcoin’s future is very
much in doubt . . . I believe that electronic forms of money could give us
better pricing, contracting and risk management.”313 Moreover,
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Bitcoin has been a bubble. But the legacy of the Bitcoin
experience should be that we move toward a system of
stable economic units of measurement
a system
empowered by sophisticated mechanisms of electronic
payment.314
IX. CONCLUSION
[108] Virtual currencies have quickly become a reality, gaining
significant traction in a very short period of time, and are evolving rapidly.
Innovation in the pace of development of new currencies and technologies
continues to create ongoing challenges for responsible users of technology
and regulators alike. Virtual currencies, due primarily to its anonymous
characteristic, have been linked to numerous types of crimes, including
facilitating marketplaces for: assassins; attacks on businesses; child
exploitation (including pornography); corporate espionage; counterfeit
currencies; drugs; fake IDs and passports; high yield investment schemes;
sexual exploitation; stolen credit cards and credit card numbers; and
weapons. While technological advances create great opportunities to
improve the health, living conditions, and general wellbeing of mankind;
new technologies also create great challenges for nation states.
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